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N 1995, the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors 
of the University of Virginia1 held that the University of Virginia 
had violated the Constitution when it distributed money to student 
organizations but refused to fund “religious activities.” Nine years 
later, in Locke v. Davey,2 the Supreme Court appeared to contra-
dict itself. It held that the state of Washington had not violated the 
Constitution in denying scholarship money to students of devo-
tional theology, while providing scholarships to students in all 
other disciplines. These cases seem at best conflicted and at worst 
unprincipled. This Note explores the doctrinal confusion, which in 
many ways began with Rosenberger, and seeks to bring clarity to 
the jurisprudence. 
I 
The Court in Rosenberger found that the University, by inviting 
a plethora of student organizations to partake of an activities fund 
and contribute to the life of the University, had created a limited 
public forum in which all viewpoints were welcome. Allowing reli-
gious speech was part of the bargain. In the rare instance when the 
government creates a public forum—a venue for free speech by 
private individuals—the government is not allowed to disfavor any 
viewpoints, including religious ones. Since Rosenberger, the Su-
preme Court and lower courts have read the case narrowly and 
 
1 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
2 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
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treated it as only a public forum case. But this is not the only, or 
even the most natural, reading of Rosenberger.  
This Note explores the idea that the Court in Rosenberger went 
further and announced a broad principle of nondiscrimination 
against religion. While public fora had traditionally involved 
places, such as streets and parks, Rosenberger extended the logic 
into the realm of funding schemes. This move could have obliter-
ated a distinction that the Court had long drawn between places 
and funding schemes. Public fora have always been at one end of 
the spectrum. They are places in which the government must be-
have with utmost neutrality because streets and parks are quintes-
sential places where citizens may speak freely. At the other end of 
the spectrum are funding decisions that the government makes. 
The government has always enjoyed wide latitude over what it 
chooses to fund and, just as significantly, what it chooses not to 
fund. Courts have almost uniformly ignored the proverbial ele-
phant in the room: Rosenberger was a funding case. The Court in 
Rosenberger applied the stringent criteria of the public forum doc-
trine to a funding decision, an area in which the government’s dis-
cretion is usually at its apex. In addition to exploring the idea that 
Rosenberger was a funding case—though this is not the dominant 
reading of the opinion—this Note also discusses the nondiscrimina-
tion principle possibly announced by the Court. 
If Rosenberger does embody a broad nondiscrimination princi-
ple, there are two other lines of doctrine that, at first blush, stand 
in tension with such a principle. One line of precedent involves the 
theory of “play in the joints,” the notion that there is a gap be-
tween what the Establishment Clause forbids and what the Free 
Exercise Clause requires. Davey was the first Supreme Court case 
to endorse “play in the joints” in an actual holding. The concept of 
a gap between the two Religion Clauses is in some ways intuitive, 
even though the Court has not systematically developed the the-
ory. For instance, legislative prayer is permissible under the Estab-
lishment Clause; however, someone cannot demand, on the 
strength of the Free Exercise Clause, that a legislature support 
such prayers. The other precedents that potentially stand in tension 
with a broad nondiscrimination principle are the funding cases. In 
many ways, the traditional latitude that the government has over 
funding decisions is most difficult to square with Rosenberger. 
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This Note critically examines the three lines of precedent and 
argues that, despite their apparent tension, they are reconcilable 
and can usefully balance competing values. Part I analyzes Rosen-
berger and the broad nondiscrimination principle that derives from 
it. Part II examines the theory of “play in the joints,” which almost 
surely will constitute Davey’s most enduring legacy, and the extent 
to which the theory had been a fixture of Religion Clauses doctrine 
before Davey. Largely owing to the recentness of Davey, scholars 
have not yet addressed this question. Part III explores the funding 
cases and the wide discretion that they generally afford to the gov-
ernment. Part IV then triangulates the three lines of precedent, ar-
guing that a broad nondiscrimination principle can coexist with 
both a theory of “play in the joints” and the premises of the fund-
ing cases. Despite the ability to reconcile the three lines of cases, 
courts have assumed that they must choose one of the precedents 
to govern any given problem. Part IV analyzes how courts have 
treated each line of cases, including how courts have unsatisfyingly 
cabined Rosenberger as nothing more than a public forum case. 
I. ROSENBERGER, THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE, AND A BROAD 
NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE 
A broad nondiscrimination principle is potentially discernible 
from the Supreme Court’s language in Rosenberger. This Part as-
sesses whether the logic of the public forum doctrine, especially as 
presented in Rosenberger, applies outside of the forum context, 
thereby creating a broad principle of nondiscrimination against re-
ligion. Of particular relevance is the academic commentary after 
Rosenberger that discussed the reach of the public forum doctrine. 
This Part concludes that a broad nondiscrimination principle read-
ily derives from Rosenberger; however, as Parts II and III discuss, 
other lines of precedent necessarily restrict the expansiveness of 
the principle. 
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A. Rosenberger 
1. Rosenberger’s Public Forum Holding 
Rosenberger involved the distribution of funds to student organi-
zations at the University of Virginia. Wide Awake Publications 
(“WAP”) was a student group3 primarily engaged in publishing 
Wide Awake, a journal4 dedicated to offering a Christian perspec-
tive on contemporary issues.5 Certain student organizations were 
allowed to apply for funding from the Student Activities Fund 
(“SAF”) in accordance with the University Guidelines.6 The 
Guidelines, however, delineated certain endeavors to which SAF 
monies could not be directed, including “religious” and “political” 
activities as well as other activities that would have jeopardized the 
University’s tax-exempt status.7 WAP applied for SAF funds in or-
3 WAP was registered as a “Contracted Independent Organization” (“CIO”). Any 
student group that met certain minimal prerequisites was eligible to register as a CIO. 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823. 
4 The Fourth Circuit noted WAP’s objection to defining Wide Awake as a “journal,” 
preferring instead the word “perspective.” Nomenclature aside, WAP operated 
analogously to other student-run publications. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 272 n.4 (4th Cir. 1994). 
5 WAP’s stated purposes included “publishing a magazine of philosophical and reli-
gious expression,” “facilitating discussion which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity 
to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints,” and “providing a unifying focus for Chris-
tians of multicultural backgrounds.” Id. at 271–72. This language is still in WAP’s 
charter on file with the University. Constitution of Wide Awake Productions, art. 1, 
http://www.virginia.edu/newcombhall/sac/search_display_constitution.php?org_id=17
2 (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). 
6 The University maintained the SAF, to which each student contributed a manda-
tory fee of $14 per semester, in order to promote an array of activities “related to the 
educational purpose of the University.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824. During the 
1990–91 academic year, 343 CIOs were registered at the University. Of these, 135 ap-
plied for SAF funding, and 118 organizations actually received funding. Fifteen of 
those 118 organizations were student publications, but according to WAP founder 
Ronald Rosenberger, none of the fifteen journals provided a “forum for Christian ex-
pression,” a void that Wide Awake sought to fill. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271–72. 
7 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825. The Supreme Court noted that only electioneering 
and lobbying came under the rubric of unfundable “political activities,” whereas fund-
ing was theoretically available to organizations that espoused a particular political 
viewpoint or ideology. By contrast, SAF monies were not available for any “religious 
activity,” which the Guidelines defined as an activity that “primarily promotes or 
manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” Id. Although 
some organizations with religious trappings did receive funding, the University argued 
that those organizations qualified as “cultural organizations.” Brief for Respondents 
at 5–6, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (No. 94-329). The difference, according to the Uni-
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der to cover $5862 in printing costs, but the University rejected the 
request on the grounds that WAP had sought funding for a reli-
gious activity.8 Ronald Rosenberger, the founder of WAP, chal-
lenged the University Guidelines as a violation of the First Amend-
ment. 
The Supreme Court’s decision rested primarily on the conclu-
sion that the University of Virginia had created a limited public fo-
rum and, therefore, could not exclude potential participants based 
on their viewpoint. In essence, the University compelled students 
to contribute to the SAF and thereby sought to foster a diversity of 
viewpoints, a goal consistent with the University’s mission of pro-
viding secular education.9
The public forum doctrine is an exception to the axiom that the 
Free Speech Clause confers only negative rights.10 While the First 
Amendment prohibits governmental interference with free speech, 
it does not create an entitlement to governmental support. Since 
1939, though, the Supreme Court has recognized that government 
ownership of property does not entail an unfettered right to ex-
clude speech.11 Certain government property, such as streets and 
parks, has become a “public forum” by virtue of its historical pedi-
gree as a venue for the expression of ideas.12
versity, was that “[k]ey elements of [religious] activities are religious observances and 
proselytizing.” Id. at 6; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Rosenberger, 515 
U.S. 819 (No. 94-329). The University argued credibly that organizations engaged in 
academic discussion—regarding politics or religion—do serve the University’s mission 
of pursuing truth, whereas organizations that presume their conclusions to be correct 
(such as political or religious advocacy organizations) are fundamentally different. 
Despite the elegance of this distinction, the Court in Rosenberger placed great weight 
on the Guidelines’ own definition of “religious activity,” which seemed overinclusive. 
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840. 
8 The Student Council initially rejected the request, and on appeal the University’s 
Student Activities Committee affirmed the Student Council’s decision. Rosenberger, 
18 F.3d at 273–74. 
9 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840–41. 
10 For a succinct overview of the development of the public forum doctrine, see 
Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 
1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 81–96. 
11 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939). 
12 See id. at 515–16 (observing, in a plurality opinion, that certain public property 
has “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions”). Professor Kalven coined the phrase “public forum” 
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The modern era of public forum analysis recognizes three or 
four types of public fora, depending on who is counting. At one 
end of the spectrum is a traditional public forum, which the gov-
ernment can regulate only in rare situations. At the other end is the 
nonpublic forum, which the government has the most latitude to 
regulate. In between are designated and limited public fora.13 Al-
though the Supreme Court has been less than clear in defining this 
sliding scale, all fora share one thing in common—the requirement 
of viewpoint neutrality. Even when the government may limit a fo-
rum to certain classes of speakers or to certain subject matters, it 
may never discriminate in a forum based on someone’s viewpoint 
or perspective.14 For purposes of this Note, the precise contours of 
to describe such property. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox 
v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 11–12. 
13 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n established the initial tripartite 
formulation of traditional public fora, designated public fora, and nonpublic fora. 460 
U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). In traditional public fora, any regulations must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 45. In nonpublic fora, regulations are 
permissible if they are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Id. at 46. The jurisprudence 
surrounding these categories is relatively settled. The middle ground is where contro-
versy and confusion have characterized the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, lower 
court opinions, and academic commentary. For instance, it is unclear whether “desig-
nated public forum” and “limited public forum” are interchangeable terms. The Ninth 
Circuit aptly summarized this point of confusion: “Some courts and commentators 
refer to a ‘designated public forum’ as a ‘limited public forum’ and use the terms in-
terchangeably. But they are not the same, at least not in this circuit.” Hopper v. City 
of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). In a related vein, the Supreme Court has 
occasionally treated limited fora as a subset of designated fora and at other times has 
regarded limited fora as a subset of nonpublic fora. Compare Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001) (treating Perry, which involved a nonpublic fo-
rum, as a limited public forum case) with Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, 
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 791 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (treating limited public fora as a subset 
of designated public fora). Finally, it is unclear what kinds of regulations are permis-
sible in this middle ground. Compare BeVier, supra note 10, at 92–93 (arguing that 
subject-matter restrictions are permissible in nonpublic fora but not in designated 
public fora) with Douglas Laycock, Comment: Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of 
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 
118 Harv. L. Rev. 155, 221 (2004) (“Designated . . . forums can be open to private 
speakers but may be limited by subject matter or speaker identity.”). 
14 One of the principal debates between the majority and dissenters in Rosenberger 
concerned whether the exclusion of “religious activities” from eligibility for the SAF 
constituted viewpoint discrimination or a legitimate subject-matter restriction. In any 
forum, even a nonpublic forum, viewpoint discriminatory restrictions are unconstitu-
tional. Justice Souter, in dissent, noted that certain subject-matter distinctions are 
permissible in limited public fora: “In a limited-access forum, a speech restriction 
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the forum categories are not critical. Instead, the focus is on the 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality and, specifically, whether it ex-
tends beyond the public forum analysis into other areas of gov-
ernment action. 
In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court held that the University had 
created a limited public forum. Although the SAF constituted “a 
forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic 
sense,” the Court held that the same governing principles should 
obtain.15 Here the Court quickly elided from geographic fora, like 
public school facilities,16 to so-called metaphysical fora, which cre-
ate audiences, in a very abstract sense, through the expenditure of 
generally available money. Despite the Court’s seemingly logical 
progression, the gap between geography and metaphysics is quite 
wide. In public forum cases, the Court had traditionally concerned 
itself with places, rather than means, of communication. As dis-
cussed below, the Court had historically drawn a critical distinction 
between places and funding schemes, yet Rosenberger blurred that 
distinction. 
2. The Textual Basis for a Broad Nondiscrimination Principle 
What this Note terms Rosenberger’s broad nondiscrimination 
principle derives textually from the Fourth Circuit opinion and the 
Supreme Court’s response to it. In no uncertain terms, the Fourth 
must be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum as well as viewpoint 
neutral.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 893 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted). Justice Souter posited that the essence of viewpoint dis-
crimination is the skewing of public debate. To the extent that the University ex-
cluded an entire subject matter from the SAF—religious activities—such a limitation 
did not entail viewpoint discrimination. The University, in the dissenters’ view, 
treated all religious perspectives equally and thus did not skew the public debate. Id. 
at 894–96. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority rejected this approach. While 
conceding that the line between viewpoint and more general content-based discrimi-
nation is somewhat murky, the Court held that the University had engaged in view-
point discrimination. The University Guidelines did not single out specific religions, 
but the Guidelines’ exclusion did skew public debate by permitting funding for secu-
lar, but not religious, perspectives. Id. at 830–32 (majority opinion). For an argument 
that the majority unhelpfully blurred the distinction between subject-matter and 
viewpoint-based distinctions, see Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From Olympus, 96 
Colum. L. Rev. 697, 707–08 (1996). 
15 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. 
16 See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 
(1993). 
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Circuit held that the University’s policy of excluding religious ac-
tivities from eligibility for SAF funding involved viewpoint dis-
crimination;17 however, the Fourth Circuit found that a countervail-
ing constitutional value, embodied in the Establishment Clause, 
ultimately justified the Guidelines’ exclusionary policy.18 The Su-
preme Court seemed to accept the Fourth Circuit’s premises but 
found that making Wide Awake eligible for SAF funds would not 
run afoul of the Establishment Clause. At least within the public 
forum context, only an actual Establishment Clause violation could 
justify facially disparate treatment of religious perspectives.19
According to the Fourth Circuit, the University had engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination when it made religious commentary ineli-
gible for SAF funding.20 The court emphasized that while the Uni-
versity was under no compulsion to provide funding for student or-
ganizations, SAF funds, once generally available, “must be 
distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner, absent considerations of 
equal constitutional dignity.”21 Even though the Fourth Circuit 
found that the University had not created a public forum,22 view-
point neutrality was still presumptively required.23
Despite finding that the Guidelines entailed viewpoint discrimi-
nation, the Fourth Circuit noted that the restrictions could be justi-
fiable if they served a compelling state interest and were narrowly 
tailored to achieve that purpose. The court held that avoiding a 
violation of the Establishment Clause was a compelling state inter-
est and that the University would have violated the Establishment 
Clause if WAP had been eligible for SAF funding.24 “Using public 
funds to support a publication so clearly engaged in the propaga-
tion of particular religious doctrines would constitute a patent Es-
tablishment Clause violation.”25
17 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 281 (4th Cir. 1994).
18 Id. at 287. 
19 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46. 
20 Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 280–81. 
21 Id. at 281 (emphasis added). 
22 Id. at 278–79. 
23 Id. at 280–81. 
24 Id. at 281–82, 285. Importantly, the Fourth Circuit found that the University 
Guidelines neither evinced an impermissible purpose (that is, hostility toward relig-
ion) nor inhibited the practice of religion. Id. at 284–85. 
25 Id. at 285. 
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The Supreme Court opinion in Rosenberger never explicitly ar-
ticulated that only an actual Establishment Clause violation can 
justify abridgement of other First Amendment freedoms. In light 
of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, however, the Supreme Court deci-
sion takes on added significance. Justice Kennedy, in the final 
paragraph of the majority opinion, stated in relevant part: 
To obey the Establishment Clause, it was not necessary for the 
University to deny eligibility to student publications because of 
their viewpoint. The neutrality commanded of the State by the 
separate Clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by 
the University’s course of action. . . . There is no Establishment 
Clause violation in the University’s honoring its duties under the 
Free Speech Clause.26
The Supreme Court’s language is interesting for two reasons. First, 
and most obviously, it signals that a nondiscrimination principle 
might apply not only to the Free Speech Clause but to the Free 
Exercise Clause as well. The remainder of this Part grapples with 
the validity of that construction. Second, and somewhat less obvi-
ously, the underlying premise of Justice Kennedy’s statement 
stands in contrast to the idea that the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause are in tension. Instead of treating the Relig-
ion Clauses as a minefield of contradictory commands, as the Court 
had done for decades and as Chief Justice Rehnquist later did in 
Locke v. Davey,27 Justice Kennedy appeared to regard them as be-
ing in a symbiotic relationship.28 According to this view, the various 
clauses of the First Amendment do not necessarily conflict; rather, 
they articulate a standard of neutrality that the state must ob-
serve.29 When the government scrupulously respects the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, it behaves neutrally with re-
26 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46. 
27 540 U.S. at 718. 
28 See Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and the 
Future of State Payments for Services Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 Tulsa L. 
Rev. 227, 245–46 (2004) (criticizing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s characterization of the 
tension in the Religion Clauses). 
29 The Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses read as follows: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. Const. 
amend. I. 
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spect to religion, such that the Establishment Clause is not even 
implicated. Thus, under at least some circumstances, there are no 
competing interests that courts have to balance. 
What is also striking about both the Fourth Circuit and Supreme 
Court opinions is the two courts’ agreement that the University 
had engaged in viewpoint, not just subject-matter, discrimination.30 
By implication, they also agreed that the exclusion of religious ac-
tivities from SAF eligibility could rest only on the need to preserve 
a countervailing constitutional value. The Fourth Circuit implied 
that only an Establishment Clause violation would satisfy this re-
quirement. Justice Kennedy and the majority apparently agreed, 
such that the real debate between the two courts was whether the 
University would in fact have run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause by allowing WAP to receive SAF funds. The Supreme 
Court answered this question in the negative. Only an actual Estab-
lishment Clause violation would have justified differential treat-
ment of religious organizations and the perspectives that they ar-
ticulated. The Supreme Court believed that this query was 
dispositive of the case, refusing to leave open a cliff effects argu-
ment whereby the University could justify differential treatment of 
religious groups in order to steer clear of potential Establishment 
Clause violations. After Rosenberger, there appeared to be no 
“play in the joints” between the Establishment Clause and the 
other First Amendment rights.31
The textual basis for a nondiscrimination principle thus derives 
from two aspects of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rosenberger. 
First, excluding religion from the forum was not just a subject-
30 Before both courts, the University lost on the question of whether it had simply 
precluded an entire subject matter from SAF eligibility. At the Fourth Circuit, 
though, the University won on the question of whether the Establishment Clause jus-
tified this exclusion. Somewhat tellingly, the University abandoned its Establishment 
Clause argument before the Supreme Court, perhaps recognizing that the Court 
would find the argument unpersuasive. Instead, the University focused on the subject-
matter exclusion argument in hopes that it would prove more persuasive before the 
Supreme Court. See generally Greenawalt, supra note 14, for an insightful criticism of 
both courts’ conclusion that the University had drawn viewpoint, not just subject-
matter, distinctions. 
31 Cf. Davey, 540 U.S. at 718 (holding that the Establishment Clause and Free Exer-
cise Clause “are frequently in tension” and that the Supreme Court has long recog-
nized “room for play in the joints between them” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 
U.S. 664, 669 (1970))). 
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matter restriction; instead, it was viewpoint discrimination. Second, 
including religious voices in the forum would not have violated the 
Establishment Clause. Consequently, there was no countervailing 
constitutional interest that could have justified viewpoint discrimi-
nation. As the following Sections discuss, the fact that the Court 
advanced this logic in a funding case, far beyond the context of a 
pure public forum, ultimately gives rise to the idea that Rosenber-
ger announced a broad nondiscrimination principle. 
B. Preliminary Concerns About Locating a Broad 
Nondiscrimination Principle in Rosenberger 
Before delving further into the arguments for discerning a broad 
nondiscrimination principle from Rosenberger, this Section ad-
dresses two preliminary objections in order to establish that there 
is at least a colorable argument in favor of a nondiscrimination 
principle. First, a nondiscrimination principle, as entertained here, 
is not unqualified. It would not inflate the Free Exercise Clause 
into a guarantor of any entitlements. One axiom of the Free Exer-
cise Clause is that it does not grant individuals the right to any af-
firmative support from the state.32 Thus, the mere fact that particu-
lar governmental action would not violate the Establishment 
Clause does not give a religious organization or speaker an auto-
matic entitlement to government largesse. For instance, after Zel-
man v. Simmons-Harris,33 localities can provide school vouchers for 
use at sectarian schools without necessarily running afoul of the 
Establishment Clause. This does not create a corollary right to de-
mand that the government create a voucher scheme (at least not 
based upon the Free Exercise Clause). Instead, the nondiscrimina-
tion principle applies only once the government has affirmatively 
acted. Governmental inaction, even when it hinders the exercise of 
religion, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
32 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The 
fact that government cannot exact from me a surrender of one iota of my religious 
scruples does not, of course, mean that I can demand of government a sum of money, 
the better to exercise them. For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what 
the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can 
exact from the government.”); see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988). 
33 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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Second, one might object that reading a nondiscrimination prin-
ciple into the Free Exercise Clause, based on Rosenberger, blurs an 
important distinction between the Free Speech Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause. Traditionally, the Free Speech Clause has 
more independent clout than does the Free Exercise Clause. For 
instance, questions of “chilling effects” and “overbreadth” are 
commonplace in Free Speech jurisprudence,34 such that even po-
tential infringements of Free Speech rights are constitutionally 
problematic. These doctrines typically have no place in Free Exer-
cise cases, though.35
Any differences between the Free Speech and Free Exercise 
Clauses are arguably much less consequential in light of the con-
cession that the nondiscrimination principle is not unqualified. 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has indeed protected speech 
more than the free exercise of religion when evaluating a generally 
applicable law;36 however, the Free Exercise Clause, in at least 
some contexts, affords equally strong protection against facially 
discriminatory laws.37 Applying the logic of Free Speech cases in 
the Free Exercise context is certainly a major obstacle that any 
proponent of a broad nondiscrimination principle must overcome. 
But the argument is at least plausible and merits serious considera-
tion. 
34 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 243, 255 (2002); Bd. of Air-
port Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987); Houston v. Hill, 482 
U.S. 451, 458 (1987). 
35 See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 441–42 (holding that a law permitting timber harvest-
ing and road construction in an area of a national forest used by Native Americans for 
religious purposes did not violate the Free Exercise Clause). Although the asserted 
claim seemed more like a disparate impact claim, the respondents essentially asserted 
a chilling effect on their ability to practice a religion that was otherwise protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 447. Thus, generally applicable laws are subject to less 
stringent constitutional scrutiny in the Free Exercise context than in the Free Speech 
context. 
36 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (“The only decisions in 
which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise 
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press . . . .”).
37 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) 
(holding that in the Free Exercise context “the minimum requirement of neutrality is 
that a law not discriminate on its face”). 
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C. Early Indications of a Broad Nondiscrimination Principle 
In two cases predating Rosenberger, the Supreme Court ap-
peared to indulge the notion that the Free Exercise Clause con-
tains a strong and broad principle of nondiscrimination. In both in-
stances, though, the Court quickly disavowed the broad 
implications of its earlier holdings and effectively cabined them. 
Widmar v. Vincent marked the first time that the Supreme Court 
announced a broad nondiscrimination principle.38 In Widmar, the 
Court held that when the University of Missouri at Kansas City 
made its facilities generally available to student groups, the Uni-
versity had created a public forum and, therefore, could not ex-
clude religious groups absent a compelling state interest.39 Al-
though the Court found that avoiding an Establishment Clause 
violation was a compelling state interest, it held that allowing 
“equal access” to a public forum would not run afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause.40 The question then became whether Missouri 
could pursue a more rigorous separation of church and state. Jus-
tice Powell, on behalf of the majority, observed that “the state in-
terest asserted here—in achieving greater separation of church and 
State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution—is limited by the Free Exercise Clause 
and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well.”41
Based on Justice Powell’s observation, the Court appeared to ar-
ticulate a broad nondiscrimination principle with respect to relig-
ion fourteen years before Rosenberger. In fact, Widmar more ex-
plicitly included the Free Exercise Clause within the ambit of the 
nondiscrimination principle. But Widmar, unlike Rosenberger, did 
not lead to wide speculation that the nondiscrimination principle 
would apply outside of the public forum context. As it turned out, 
Widmar did not have legs. 
Two principal reasons explain why Widmar did not capture the 
academic imagination the way Rosenberger did. First, despite the 
sweeping language, Justice Powell made clear that the holding was 
limited to the facts of the case and that the Court was not address-
 
38 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
39 Id. at 267–70. 
40 Id. at 271. 
41 Id. at 276. 
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ing the Supremacy Clause question.42 Missouri’s asserted interest in 
ensuring a more rigorous separation of church and state could ob-
viously be trumped by the Federal Constitution. Specifically, the 
supremacy of the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses might 
have limited Missouri’s ability to enact certain nonestablishment 
provisions, but the Court in Widmar, while acknowledging the 
question, declined to resolve it. Second, the Court had not yet de-
cided cases like Mueller,43 Witters,44 and Zobrest,45 which began to 
relax the Establishment Clause’s no-aid principle. Even in light of 
those cases, the history and circumstances of Witters, recounted in 
Part II, implied that the government still had wide discretion in 
preventing state funds from flowing to religious organizations.46 In 
short, the constitutional ethos of the day indicated that the Court 
did not take seriously the notion that a broad nondiscrimination 
principle would apply outside of the public forum context. 
The second case in which the Court appeared to articulate a 
broad nondiscrimination principle was Church of the Lukumi Ba-
balu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.47 At issue was a local ordinance banning 
animal sacrifice, a central tenet of the Santeria religion, which the 
city council passed when a Santeria congregation announced plans 
to build a church in the city. The Court, through Justice Kennedy, 
declared that the state may never “target[] religious beliefs as 
such” and must behave neutrally with respect to religion.48 In de-
termining whether the government has singled out religion for dis-
favored treatment, the Court noted that “the minimum require-
ment of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.”49
Lukumi included an explicit articulation of a broad nondiscrimi-
nation principle, but the Court yet again retreated from the far-
reaching implications of the opinion’s language. Writing for the 
Court in Davey, Chief Justice Rehnquist limited Lukumi by hold-
ing that it stands only for the proposition that the state may not ex-
 
42 Id. at 275–76. 
43 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
44 Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
45 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
46 See infra notes 118–32 and accompanying text. 
47 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
48 Id. at 533. 
49 Id. 
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press animus toward religion.50 Having recast the Free Exercise in-
quiry as one that turned solely on animus, the Davey Court found 
that Washington’s constitutional provision, though more restrictive 
than the federal Establishment Clause, did not evince such hostil-
ity. Instead, Washington merely sought to ensure a reasonable 
separation of church and state consistent with the practice of most 
states during the Founding period.51
Despite Lukumi’s broad language indicating that neutrality re-
quires facial nondiscrimination, the context in which the case arose 
was significantly different than any of the equal access cases. Lu-
kumi involved a state regulation of religion itself, rather than a de-
nial of benefits. With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, “[t]he 
crucial word in the constitutional text is ‘prohibit,’”52 and the city of 
Hialeah had effectively sought to prohibit the Santeria religion. As 
Professor Laycock has argued, regulation and funding cases are 
conceptually different. Although the state, in its regulatory capac-
ity, may not single out religion for less than even-handed treat-
ment, Davey stands for the idea that the state, when providing 
funding to religious and secular organizations, does not have to be-
have with the same even-handedness.53 Thus, Davey effectively 
confined the broad nondiscrimination principle that the Court 
seemed to have announced in Lukumi. 
D. Emerging Support for Rosenberger’s Broad  
Nondiscrimination Principle 
Unlike other cases that appeared to announce a broad nondis-
crimination principle with respect to the Free Exercise Clause, 
Rosenberger was uniquely poised to effectuate what earlier cases 
could not. Widmar had little effect outside the public forum con-
text after Witters, and Lukumi pertained only to regulation rather 
than funding. Rosenberger was different for several reasons. Most 
importantly, even though the Court styled it as a public forum case, 
Rosenberger was just as much a funding case. In Widmar and other 
equal access cases, the Court had emphasized that allowing reli-
50 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720, 724–25. 
51 Id. at 723–25. 
52 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988). 
53 Laycock, supra note 13, at 216–17 (2004). 
TRAMMELL_BOOK 11/15/2006 7:19 PM 
2006] The Cabining of Rosenberger 1973 
 
gious groups to use public facilities on the same terms as other or-
ganizations, unlike providing funds to religious organizations, did 
not have the primary effect of advancing religion. Any benefits to 
religion were merely “incidental.”54 Several scholars have criticized 
this distinction as a fiction: providing direct monetary aid to relig-
ion is no different than allowing religious groups to avail them-
selves of valuable space; the difference in aid is a matter of degree, 
not kind.55 Even if the critics’ contentions are correct, the Court has 
continued to indulge the idea that the difference between access 
and funding cases matters. To the extent that Rosenberger was in-
deed a funding case, it effectuated a profound change in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. Furthermore, Rosenberger con-
tained none of the limiting language that Widmar did.56
In the immediate aftermath of Rosenberger, some commentators 
intimated that Rosenberger embodied a broad nondiscrimination 
principle. Several scholars, two of whom are now federal appellate 
court judges, queried whether Rosenberger’s prohibitions against 
viewpoint discrimination would be far-reaching, possibly extending 
beyond public fora to tuition-assistance programs.57 Professor 
Paulsen, in addition to distilling a broad nondiscrimination princi-
ple from Rosenberger, explicitly argued that the public forum 
analysis should apply to funding cases.58 Although the arguments 
advanced by these scholars rested solely on the analogy between 
funding situations and the limited public forum created by the 
University in Rosenberger, there was still one missing piece to the 
puzzle as far as most scholars were concerned—whether the Estab-
54 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273–74 (1981). 
55 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell et al., Religion and the Constitution 767–77 
(2002); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 795, 859 
n.211 (1993). 
56 See Widmar, 454 U.S. 275–76. 
57 See, e.g., McConnell et al., supra note 55, at 530 (“After Rosenberger, is the state 
not only permitted but also constitutionally required to give Larry Witters vocational 
assistance like other students?”); Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and 
Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little Blaine Amendment” and the Future of Religious Partici-
pation in Public Programs, 2 Nev. L.J. 551, 580–81 (2002). 
58 Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited 
Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speak-
ers and Groups, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 711–12 (1996) (arguing that Rosenberger 
provides the logical foundation for applying limited public forum analysis and giving 
religious groups equal access to generally available financial benefits). 
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lishment Clause permitted extension of the public forum logic in 
this way. Not until Zelman v. Simmons-Harris59 did the issue 
squarely present itself. 
When the Court decided Rosenberger, the no-aid principle was a 
hallmark of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, such that gov-
ernment programs directly benefiting religion were presumptively 
unconstitutional.60 The Court’s equal access rulings like Widmar, 
which entitled religious groups to take advantage of limited public 
fora, were the exception to the rule. In light of a strong no-aid 
principle, state constitutional provisions that barred any financial 
aid to religious organizations—such as the Missouri provision at is-
sue in Widmar and the Washington provision that led to the Davey 
litigation—perfectly tracked the federal Establishment Clause.61 
Thus, the potential conflict between state nonestablishment provi-
sions and the Free Exercise Clause was not immediately apparent 
when the Court decided Rosenberger. 
This changed with Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.62 Zelman dealt 
with a voucher scheme in Cleveland, Ohio, that granted parents a 
tuition credit if their children attended a private school, including 
 
59 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
60 The genesis of the no-aid approach was Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 
(1971) (describing the “three main evils” that the Establishment Clause forbids as 
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))). In the decade be-
fore Rosenberger, the Court had begun to retreat from a strict application of the no-
aid principle, emphasizing instead the concept of neutrality toward religion; however, 
a majority of the Court still believed that direct aid to religious organizations was un-
constitutional. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 841 (2000) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (controlling opinion) (“[W]e decided Witters [v. Washing-
ton Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986),] and Zobrest [v. Cata-
lina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993),] on the understanding that the aid was 
provided directly to the individual student who, in turn, made the choice of where to 
put that aid to use.”). 
61 See Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of 
Religious Liberty, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1810, 1859 (2004). 
62 Some might argue that the real change occurred earlier when the Supreme Court 
abandoned the principle that direct aid to religion was forbidden. See Mitchell, 530 
U.S. at 816; Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997). Although the earlier cases 
were clearly important, one could still properly describe the benefits at issue in those 
cases as “incidental” to the schools’ primary curriculum. While the distinction be-
tween funding incidental programs versus a school’s primary curriculum might be one 
of degree, rather than kind, the difference still seemed important. For an argument 
that Zelman represented the true jurisprudential shift, see Schragger, supra note 61, at 
1859. 
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religious institutions, in lieu of public schools. Although the 
voucher system resulted in some public funds eventually being di-
rected toward religious institutions, the Supreme Court found that 
the system did not violate the Establishment Clause for two princi-
pal reasons: first, the scheme made educational funds available on 
a neutral basis, irrespective of whether parents chose a secular or 
sectarian school; second, parents, rather than the state, chose how 
to spend the tuition credits.63 The operative phrase became “true 
private choice,” which cured any Establishment Clause concerns.64
The interaction of Rosenberger and Zelman teed up the question 
that Davey addressed: if preventing an Establishment Clause viola-
tion is a compelling state interest (a point on which the Fourth Cir-
cuit and the Supreme Court agreed in Rosenberger), but the Estab-
lishment Clause no longer requires that religious groups be 
excluded from neutrally available funding schemes, may states con-
tinue to enforce their more stringent nonestablishment provi-
sions?65 In light of the interaction of Rosenberger and Zelman, 
many commentators began to postulate that Rosenberger would 
take on new significance.66 The Establishment Clause was no longer 
an impediment to the broad nondiscrimination principle an-
nounced by Rosenberger. 
After Zelman, the relevant constitutional inquiry became 
whether viewpoint discrimination is constitutionally problematic 
outside of the public forum context. Some commentators have im-
properly focused on whether differentiation based on religion, 
even in the context of funding schemes, constitutes viewpoint dis-
crimination.67 After Rosenberger, it almost certainly does. Instead, 
the real focus should be on whether viewpoint discrimination is 
problematic only in public fora or in other contexts as well. As Part 
III discusses in greater length, the Court has given two conflicting 
 
63 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 661–63. 
64 Id. at 663. 
65 See Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional 
Questions, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 189 (2003). 
66 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 18; Joshua 
Edelstein, Note, Zelman, Davey, and the Case for Mandatory Government Funding 
for Religious Education, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 151, 177–78 (2004). 
67 See F. Philip Manns, Jr., Finding the “Free Play” Between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses, 71 Tenn. L. Rev. 657, 681 (2004); Edelstein, supra note 66, at 
175. 
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answers to this question. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,68 de-
cided after Rosenberger, the Court held that viewpoint discrimina-
tion was not permissible, even when an actual forum was not at is-
sue. Ten years earlier in Rust v. Sullivan,69 a case predating 
Rosenberger, the Court reached the opposite conclusion—in the 
funding context, the allocation of money for certain activities, to 
the exclusion of others, is constitutionally unproblematic.70 Few 
scholars acknowledge this doctrinal tension when arguing for or 
against the applicability of Rosenberger in the funding context.71
Since Rosenberger, and especially since Zelman, several scholars 
have endorsed the idea that Rosenberger announced a broad non-
discrimination principle. According to this perspective, viewpoint 
discrimination is anathema in the funding context just as it is with 
public fora. Although earlier cases had appeared to announce a 
broad principle of nondiscrimination against religion, Rosenberger 
was unique because it involved a funding scheme. Consequently, 
the requirement of viewpoint neutrality that had always character-
ized the public forum analysis might logically extend to any gov-
ernmental action, including the decision to create funding pro-
grams. If the government must always behave in a viewpoint-
neutral fashion, then a broad nondiscrimination principle would 
exist. The arguments in favor of such a principle gained new steam 
once Zelman made clear that providing funds to religious organiza-
tions does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause. As a 
matter of logic and jurisprudence, these arguments are certainly 
plausible and provide the necessary grounding for a broad nondis-
crimination principle. The following sections consider whether 
these arguments can withstand several important criticisms. 
68 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
69 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
70 Admittedly, the Court in Rust found that the decision to fund certain programs to 
the exclusion of others did not actually constitute viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 
194–95. The point may be somewhat academic, but it seems clear that when the gov-
ernment chooses to support certain ideas to the exclusion of others, it has chosen one 
viewpoint over another. Thus, the better way to understand Rust is not that the gov-
ernment did not engage in viewpoint discrimination, but rather that privileging cer-
tain viewpoints is unproblematic in the funding context. 
71 But see Berg, supra note 65, at 179–86. Professor Berg candidly admits the ten-
sion, but would find that voucher schemes are more analogous to the SAF in Rosen-
berger than to the funding at issue in Rust. Id. at 186. 
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E. Responses to Critics of a Broad Nondiscrimination Principle 
Opposition to the extension of the public forum analysis to fund-
ing cases can take many forms. Some opponents draw on inconse-
quential distinctions between funding schemes and the activities 
fund at issue in Rosenberger;72 however, several critics have ad-
dressed potentially substantial differences between public fora and 
funding schemes, particularly vouchers.73 In Davey, the Court re-
lied on the fact that public fora are designed to promote a diversity 
of viewpoints. Only under such specialized circumstances does the 
command of viewpoint neutrality obtain.74 Before Davey, some 
scholars anticipated this distinction, arguing that the context of a 
public forum is so unique as to render its rules inapplicable in other 
situations. Instead of simply dismissing Rosenberger and other pub-
lic forum cases as inapposite to Free Exercise cases, as the Court 
did in Davey, Professors Lupu and Tuttle have parsed principled 
distinctions between public fora and other contexts. “Ordinarily . . . 
the provision of public services—even if they have an expressive 
component—is conceptually distinct from the creation of a forum 
 
72 For instance, some commentators focus on the distinction between direct aid 
(paying money to a religious organization) and indirect aid (paying money to third 
parties who then direct the funds to a religious organization, as was the case in 
Rosenberger and Zelman). See Rita-Anne O’Neill, Note, The School Voucher Debate 
After Zelman: Can States Be Compelled to Fund Sectarian Schools Under the Fed-
eral Constitution?, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1397, 1399 (2003) (viewing the direct-indirect dis-
tinction as significant). As a formalistic matter, the distinction might function as a 
constitutional decision rule; however, the real constitutional question is whether indi-
viduals have directed the funds through private choice, and not the precise number of 
hands through which the money passes. On a related note, some might point to the 
language in Rosenberger distinguishing the SAF, to which only University students 
contributed, from a general tax assessment. Again, for constitutional purposes, the 
distinction should be irrelevant, because regardless of who contributes to the funding 
scheme, a state institution would still choose whether to make the funds available to 
religious groups. See Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and 
Religious Persecution, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 568 n.320 (2003) (arguing that the 
Court’s distinction is unpersuasive). 
73 In an analysis of whether the logic of Rosenberger and Zelman would require that 
religious schools be allowed to participate in voucher programs, Professor Tushnet 
discusses three possible reasons why Rosenberger might not be applicable in the fund-
ing context. Interestingly, none of the three rests on the proposition that Rosenberger 
is only a public forum case. Tushnet, supra note 66, at 19–21. 
74 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3. 
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for debate.”75 That is, only in the narrow circumstance in which 
government promotes a diversity of viewpoints for the inherent 
value thereof do the stringent rules of the public forum apply. 
When the government seeks to accomplish any other goal, it neces-
sarily must choose between competing alternatives. According to 
this view, the existence of a public forum is a rare instance when 
the government must fund something. 
Despite the analytical elegance of differentiating public fora 
from almost everything else the government chooses to fund, three 
responses seem plausible. First, and most importantly, Rosenberger 
is a funding case. Courts have frequently observed that Rosenber-
ger is a public forum case and thereby implied that it is not appli-
cable to funding cases.76 This is a false dichotomy because Rosen-
berger is both a public forum case and a funding case.77 Some might 
object to this characterization of Rosenberger since the University 
did not pay funds directly to a religious organization.78 Funding 
cases, however, rarely entail such direct payment of public re-
sources to support the workings of a religious organization. In-
stead, they most often involve the provision of general resources 
that greatly benefit such an organization.79 For instance, in Board 
of Education v. Allen,80 when New York provided secular text-
books to religious schools, it did not pay funds directly to a sectar-
ian institution, nor did it directly support the schools’ core religious 
teachings. Nonetheless, one can hardly doubt that Allen is a fund-
ing case. Similarly, in her Rosenberger concurrence, Justice 
 
75 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, 
and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 917, 980 
(2003). Comparing voucher programs and true public fora, Professors Lupu and Tut-
tle note that “a voucher program may exclude schools that teach that the Earth is flat, 
even though a public forum on the shape of the planet may not exclude such a view.” 
Id. at 981.
76 See infra notes 186–89, 210–13 and accompanying text. 
77 See Duncan, supra note 72, at 569 (arguing that “Rosenberger logically applied to 
a discriminatory funding scheme the principles of religious non-persecution found in 
the earlier religious speech cases”). 
78 The payments were indirect, and even though WAP was engaged in a “religious 
activity,” it was not actually a “religious organization.” See supra note 7 and accom-
panying text. 
79 See Laycock, supra note 13, at 163. 
80 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
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O’Connor conceded that funding of a religious activity, albeit indi-
rectly, was at issue.81
Perhaps one could argue that Rosenberger’s status as a public fo-
rum case subsumes any trappings it may have of a funding case. 
The main problem with this approach is that it seeks to convert a 
disbursement of funds into a public forum and thereby ignore the 
fact that any money has inured to the benefit of a religious organi-
zation. Before Rosenberger, the Court had long drawn a distinction 
between public fora involving space and funding schemes involving 
money.82 Although some scholars have argued that allowing reli-
gious groups to use public space is not constitutionally distinct 
from inviting them to partake of a neutral funding scheme,83 the 
difference is more than one of degree. Intuitively, the benefit to a 
religious organization that avails itself of a physical public forum is 
de minimis, whereas a monetary contribution attains a greater level 
of significance. 
There is also a meaningful doctrinal difference between public 
fora and funding schemes. If the government permits unfettered 
speech in a park, it cannot, for example, allow speech by those who 
think that the Vietnam War was justified and prohibit speech by 
those who think it was unjustified. By contrast, if the government 
builds a memorial to Vietnam War veterans, hardly anyone would 
argue that the government has a concomitant obligation to build a 
memorial to the war’s protesters. Both scenarios—and their com-
monsense outcomes—correspond to the idea that a meaningful dif-
ference exists between places and funding schemes. In public 
places, where people traditionally congregate and engage in dia-
logue, viewpoint discrimination is especially odious. But when gov-
ernment spends public money, it necessarily makes policy choices 
that not everyone will embrace. The state must have wide discre-
tion to prefer certain viewpoints when spending public funds. By 
holding that money could constitute a public forum, the Court in 
Rosenberger blurred the distinction between equal access cases and 
 
81 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846–47 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
82 For an interesting argument that the Court subtly announced a new definition of 
neutrality with respect to religion by extending the nondiscrimination principle to 
funding cases, see Jason S. Marks, Only a “Speed Bump” Separating Church and 
State?, 57 J. Mo. B. 36, 41 (2001). 
83 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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funding cases, vastly expanding the reach of the nondiscrimination 
principle beyond the forum context. 
The second response to arguments against a broad nondiscrimi-
nation principle is that, as Professor Laycock has argued, the 
Court’s analysis in Rust v. Sullivan is inapplicable to a funding case 
in which religion is the basis for differential treatment. For anyone 
who would find a broad nondiscrimination principle in Rosenber-
ger, Rust is one of the most problematic cases. At issue was 
whether the government could prevent family planning facilities 
that received government funding from discussing abortion with 
patients. The Supreme Court upheld the restriction. Rust essen-
tially stands for the proposition that even though a constitutional 
right might exist, such as the right to have an abortion, the gov-
ernment does not have to fund the exercise of that right and may 
even express disapproval of it. Thus, the government may engage 
in selective funding that intentionally discourages the exercise of 
the right to have an abortion. Even if Rust states a general proposi-
tion to this effect, religion arguably is an exception because of the 
constitutional imperative that government remain neutral toward 
religion. Although the Free Exercise Clause may not create an ab-
solute entitlement to governmental support for religious activity, 
the First Amendment requires that the government affirmatively 
avoid any expression of disapproval. While the government may 
engage in selective funding to discourage abortions, such discretion 
is arguably limited with respect to religion.84
If the government can persuasively argue that exclusion of relig-
ion from a generally available funding scheme is motivated by a 
strong interest in separationism, rather than animus, perhaps there 
has been no expression of disapproval. Even in light of this 
counterargument, though, Professor Laycock seems correct in sug-
gesting that abortion and religion present conceptually different 
cases. While government may officially disapprove of abortion and 
 
84 Berg & Laycock, supra note 28, at 235–36; Laycock, supra note 13, at 176–78. This 
argument has intuitive appeal and may well represent a persuasive case for Rust’s in-
applicability when funds are available to religious organizations; however, there is 
something question-begging about it. Although the Religion Clauses do prohibit gov-
ernmental disapproval of religion, defining the concept of disapproval is important. 
Davey, for instance, is cagey about whether the disqualification of devotional theol-
ogy majors from the Promise Scholarship program constitutes official disapproval. 
Davey, 540 U.S. at 720. 
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refuse to fund it, even the taint of governmental disapproval re-
garding religion is probably impermissible. 
The third response to opponents of a nondiscrimination princi-
ple is that the goals of the public forum doctrine and the Religion 
Clauses are often salutary. Importing public forum analysis into 
funding cases involving religion might thus be legitimate and doc-
trinally justifiable. Professor BeVier has argued that the categories 
comprising the modern public forum analysis roughly correspond 
to notions of when government regulation of speech is most sus-
pect.85 According to this theory, the public forum doctrine is best 
understood as reflecting a distortion model, according to which the 
principal concern of the Free Speech Clause is preventing the gov-
ernment from manipulating public debate. The public forum cate-
gories identify those situations in which a skewing of public dis-
course is most likely and restrains governmental discretion 
accordingly.86 In the Religion Clauses context, Professor Laycock 
has identified a similar anti-skewing principle, which he terms 
“substantive neutrality.”87 According to this view, the constitutional 
test for whether the government has behaved neutrally with re-
spect to religion turns on whether the government has substan-
tively altered the incentives for someone to engage in or abstain 
from religious exercise.88
Read together, the theories advanced by Professor BeVier and 
Professor Laycock indicate that the First Amendment embodies an 
anti-skewing principle. This is not to claim that the various doc-
trines of First Amendment jurisprudence are interchangeable 
 
85 BeVier, supra note 10, at 121. 
86 Id. at 102–05. For instance, regulations of traditional public fora, such as streets 
and parks, receive the most scrutiny in part because the government has an absolute 
monopoly over them. Id. at 107. 
87 Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Re-
ligion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1001 (1990). 
88 Id. at 1001–03. For example, in determining whether a prohibition on the con-
sumption of alcohol must except the use of sacramental wine, the relevant inquiry is 
whether granting or refusing to grant an exemption skews religious incentives. Ar-
guably an exemption does not encourage more religious participation. “It is conceiv-
able that the prospect of a tiny nip would encourage some desperate folks to join a 
church that uses real wine . . . . but only to a law professor or an economist.” Id. at 
1003. By contrast, failing to grant an exemption for religious uses of wine would se-
verely discourage religious exercise. Id. Admittedly, Professor Laycock’s view, though 
eminently reasonable, has not attracted universal acceptance. See id. at 994–95. 
TRAMMELL_BOOK 11/15/2006 7:19 PM 
1982 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 92:1957 
parts. But to the extent that a Free Speech doctrine can help effec-
tuate the goals of the Religion Clauses, such doctrinal fluidity 
could be beneficial. Especially in light of the Court’s recent Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence, which tends to emphasize neutrality 
over the no-aid principle, the logic of the public forum doctrine fits 
cleanly into the modern controversy surrounding the funding cases. 
The newly relaxed Establishment Clause permits religious organi-
zations to take advantage of certain government funds. Now that 
governments have the option of including religious organizations in 
funding schemes, a decision either way—to fund or not to fund—
reflects an actual choice by the government; it is no longer a result 
preordained by the Establishment Clause. The government, en-
dowed with new funding discretion, now has the ability to skew in-
dividuals’ religious options.89 If an anti-skewing principle is indeed 
a hallmark of the Religion Clauses, the principles of the public fo-
rum doctrine can alleviate the potential for skewing. This might 
suggest that despite the government’s general latitude over funding 
decisions, those decisions must be viewpoint neutral with respect to 
religion. Unlike the intractable problem of defining what counts as 
“disapproval” of religion, the skewing analysis is arguably more 
objective. In determining whether the government should include 
religion in a funding scheme, the salient question becomes whether 
inclusion or exclusion would substantively alter someone’s incen-
tive to engage in religious exercise. 
Although there are principled reasons for believing that public 
fora are unique, those reasons do not necessarily refute arguments 
in favor of finding a broad nondiscrimination principle in Rosen-
berger. As discussed above, there are three main arguments for be-
lieving that a nondiscrimination principle is still plausible. First, 
and most importantly, Rosenberger was both a funding case and a 
public forum case, indicating the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
extend forum logic to funding schemes. Second, differentiation 
based on religion is inherently suspect, such that a nondiscrimina-
tion principle remains viable notwithstanding Rust. Finally, extend-
ing the public forum doctrine to funding schemes, thereby creating 
 
89 One might argue that under the categorical no-aid principle, religious options 
were always skewed. Even if this is true, the skewing resulted from constitutional 
compulsion. Skewing is arguably less tolerable when the government has the latitude 
to make an actual choice. 
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a broad nondiscrimination principle, serves to prevent skewing of 
religious options. Arguments opposing a broad nondiscrimination 
principle are thus far from conclusive.90
F. Grounding a Nondiscrimination Principle in the Equal 
Protection Clause 
Given the Supreme Court’s current Free Exercise jurisprudence, 
some judges have suggested that the Equal Protection Clause 
might offer a more effective way to challenge facial discrimination 
against religion. Recent cases have emphasized that “prohibit” is 
the operative word in the Free Exercise Clause, such that exclusion 
of religious organizations from funding programs might not offend 
the First Amendment,91 a proposition that Davey supported.92 Al-
 
90 Some scholars have made two other arguments in favor of a nondiscrimination 
principle, but these arguments are less convincing and do not usefully advance the 
debate. The first argument is that funding schemes, such as vouchers or scholarships, 
are not simply analogous to public fora but actually are fora for speech. According to 
this argument, schools teach from different viewpoints; voucher programs and 
scholarships seek to encourage such diversity; hence, vouchers are fora for speech. 
See, e.g., Berg, supra note 65, at 179. The supposed syllogism fails because the rele-
vant question is whether the vouchers or scholarships, not the schools as such, func-
tion as fora for expression. When the government adopts a funding scheme enabling 
students to attend the private school of their choice, the government promotes educa-
tion, not the exchange of ideas. To be sure, education involves the dissemination of 
ideas from specific viewpoints, but the various schools that participate in a voucher 
program are not in dialogue among themselves about the viewpoints that they pro-
mote. 
 The second line of inquiry that seems unfruitful concerns the dichotomy that schol-
ars and courts sometimes draw by asking who is speaking—the government or a pri-
vate individual? See infra notes 152–58 and accompanying text; see also Berg & Lay-
cock, supra note 28, at 233; Duncan, supra note 72, at 585; Michael Kavey, Note, 
Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right To Discriminate, 113 Yale 
L.J. 743, 757 (2003). The dichotomy is often false, though, because funding schemes 
frequently have nothing to do with communicating a message or, at most, have only 
an incidental effect on speech. When the government funds a particular activity, the 
government might be unconcerned with any speech attendant to the activity. For in-
stance, if the government provides financial support on a neutral basis to soup kitch-
ens, it seems highly unlikely that the government is interested in any particular mes-
sage. The purpose of the program is to feed the indigent. It would be quixotic and 
nonsensical to ask who is speaking and what the message is. 
91 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988). 
92 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 720; see also Eulitt v. Me., Dep’t of Educ. 386 F.3d 344, 354 
(1st Cir. 2004). Some scholars have objected to the Court’s conclusion that the word 
“prohibit” in the Free Exercise Clause is narrower than the phrases pertaining to 
other First Amendment freedoms, arguing that the Court’s interpretation is incorrect 
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though Davey found that the Equal Protection claim essentially 
piggy-backed on the Free Exercise argument,93 this conclusion is 
premature. 
Even in light of “play in the joints” between what the Establish-
ment Clause forbids and what the Free Exercise Clause requires, 
the Equal Protection Clause may require that funding schemes not 
facially discriminate against religion. The Court in Davey said that 
without a Free Exercise right, the plaintiff had no fundamental 
right to even-handed treatment of religion in the context of a fund-
ing scheme. In the absence of a fundamental right, a law that is not 
facially neutral with respect to religion need survive only rational 
basis scrutiny. Davey found that Washington’s asserted interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and state could withstand 
such scrutiny.94 Despite the lack of a fundamental right based on 
the Free Exercise Clause, other courts have given more credence 
to an Equal Protection challenge based on facially disparate treat-
ment of religion. For instance, a Maine voucher program prohib-
ited parents from using state funds to send their children to private 
sectarian schools. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine and the 
First Circuit upheld the facial differentiation based on religion, 
opining that the Establishment Clause required such a result.95 
(Both cases preceded Zelman, the Supreme Court decision holding 
that the Establishment Clause does not necessarily prohibit 
voucher programs involving sectarian schools.) The Maine court 
observed, however, that the Equal Protection Clause would be an 
impediment to the disparate treatment of religion unless the Estab-
lishment Clause required such differentiation.96 In a concurrence, 
 
as a matter of original intent. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and His-
torical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1486–88 
(1990). 
93 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3. 
94 Id. at 720–22. 
95 Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 1999); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t, 
728 A.2d 127, 147 (Me. 1999). 
96 Bagley, 728 A.2d at 138 (conversely noting that “[i]f the exclusion is required in 
order to comply with the Establishment Clause, the State will have presented a com-
pelling justification for the disparate treatment of religious schools, and the parents’ 
Equal Protection claim will fail”); see also id. at 150 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that “the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination based on religion in a pro-
gram providing . . . [tuition] aid unless the discrimination is absolutely necessary to 
avoid Establishment Clause violations”). 
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Judge Campbell of the First Circuit endorsed the Maine court’s 
dictum.97
Supposing that a plaintiff cannot establish a Free Exercise right 
to avail himself of a funding scheme, he might be able to argue that 
facially disparate treatment of religion cannot satisfy even rational 
basis scrutiny absent an actual Establishment Clause violation. 
Such an approach would essentially impute animus to a state that 
singles out religion for differential treatment. Davey refused to im-
pute animus to the State of Washington; however, the argument 
still seems plausible, principally because it simply shifts the burden 
of proof to the defendant to justify why a funding scheme should 
not treat religion evenhandedly. Although the argument might be 
difficult after Davey, it is at least colorable. 
II. “PLAY IN THE JOINTS” CASES 
Part I examined the first line of precedent—the public forum 
cases—and focused specifically on Rosenberger. Based on the text 
of the opinion and the fact that Rosenberger was a funding case, 
Part I posited that the Court arguably announced a broad nondis-
crimination principle with respect to religion. Such a conclusion, 
however, does not exist in isolation. This Part begins the process of 
triangulating the three competing lines of cases by turning to the 
second set of precedent, the “play in the joints” cases. It starts with 
a brief consideration of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Locke v. 
Davey,98 the first Religion Clauses case to endorse the maxim of 
“play in the joints” in an actual holding. Although the Court in 
Davey claimed that “play in the joints” had long existed as a fixture 
of church and state jurisprudence, the Court’s assertion is some-
what hasty. After examining the precedents in support of a “play in 
the joints” theory, this Part concludes that, even though the evi-
dence is far from dispositive, “play in the joints” had existed as a 
constitutional doctrine before Davey and that Davey faithfully ap-
plied that doctrine. While the notion of “play in the joints” has 
generated little analysis in the wake of Davey, it will probably con-
stitute Davey’s most enduring legacy. 
 
97 Strout, 178 F.3d at 66 n.13 (Campbell, J., concurring). 
98 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
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A. Locke v. Davey 
In 1999, the State of Washington created a Promise Scholarship 
Program that entitled all Washington students meeting certain re-
quirements to a scholarship in excess of $1000 for college educa-
tion.99 Any student receiving the award was bound by only two 
conditions: he or she (1) had to be enrolled at least half-time and 
(2) was not permitted to study devotional theology.100 Joshua 
Davey, a student of devotional theology at Northwest College, al-
leged that the law facially discriminated against religion and, there-
fore, was unconstitutional. Washington argued in defense that its 
constitution required an even more rigorous separation of church 
and state than did the federal Constitution.101
Until recently, the exclusion of theology majors from the Prom-
ise Scholarship program would have seemed unproblematic to 
most jurists, because relevant Supreme Court precedents indicated 
that the federal Establishment Clause required such an exclusion.102 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,103 
though, cast the question in an entirely new light. Zelman was the 
Cleveland voucher case in which the Court held that a voucher 
scheme allowing parents to send their children to sectarian schools 
did not violate the Establishment Clause.104 With Zelman, the 
 
99 Students had to graduate in the top 15% of their high school classes, score at least 
1200 on the SAT or 27 on the ACT, and have a family income of less than 135% of 
the state’s median income. The scholarship carried a value of $1,125 for the 1999–2000 
academic year and $1,542 for the 2000–01 academic year. Id. at 715–16. 
100 Id. at 716. 
101 Id. at 719 n.2 (“No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied 
to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious estab-
lishment.” (quoting Wash. Const. art. I, § 11)). 
102 Some might take issue with this assertion. In Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for 
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), the Court held that the Establishment Clause permit-
ted a recipient of state scholarship funding to attend a private religious vocational 
school of his choosing. Similarly, the Court in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 
509 U.S. 1 (1993), upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge the provision of 
a sign-language interpreter to a deaf child attending a religious school. But both cases 
are notable for their emphasis on the fact that in neither situation would the state be 
directly funding religious education as such. By contrast, general voucher schemes 
seem qualitatively different and thus more problematic under the Establishment 
Clause because state funds would arguably support the inherently religious aspects of 
a sectarian school’s curriculum. 
103 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
104 See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
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Court seemed to invite the question that it confronted two years 
later in Davey: if the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the 
inclusion of religious schools in voucher or scholarship schemes, 
does the Free Exercise Clause require that such programs be neu-
tral with respect to religion? Davey responded in the negative. The 
Supreme Court issued a short opinion that focused on whether 
Washington could enforce a more stringent nonestablishment prin-
ciple than the Establishment Clause required. 
The lynchpin of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis in Davey was 
his invocation of “play in the joints,” the logic of which the Chief 
Justice succinctly expressed: 
[T]he Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause[] are 
frequently in tension. Yet we have long said that “there is room 
for play in the joints” between them. In other words, there are 
some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but 
not required by the Free Exercise Clause.105
Aside from the doctrinal holding, which ultimately proved dis-
positive of the case, there are two notable elements to this quota-
tion. First, the majority treated as given that the Establishment 
Clause and Free Exercise Clause are in tension. If, as Supreme 
Court precedent often indicates, the Establishment Clause prohib-
its the government from “aiding” religion and the Free Exercise 
Clause requires that religion be treated evenhandedly, there is in-
deed a tension. Davey is the quintessential situation in which the 
conflict arises. Some jurists and scholars have taken issue with this 
characterization, though, typically arguing that the Supreme Court 
has created the insuperable tension by unduly expanding the reach 
of the Establishment Clause.106 To the extent that the Chief Justice 
 
105 Davey, 540 U.S. at 718–19 (citations omitted). 
106 Berg & Laycock, supra note 28, at 245–46 (“The Religion Clauses should be read 
as complementary aspects of a single principle. To interpret them as conflicting is, as 
one of us has previously argued, ‘a mistake at the most fundamental level.’”); see also 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result) (ob-
serving that “there are many situations where legitimate claims under the Free Exer-
cise Clause will run into head-on collision with the Court’s insensitive and sterile con-
struction of the Establishment Clause”); id. at 416 (arguing that “it is the Court’s duty 
to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between the Free Exercise Clause of 
the Constitution and the Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Court”) (empha-
sis added); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123, 
150–53. 
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acknowledged an inherent tension, he signaled that Davey was not 
intended to be a departure from existing precedent. Second, and 
more importantly, the Chief Justice implied that the Court had 
long embraced “play in the joints” as an integral part of the Relig-
ion Clauses. This implication, though, is an overstatement, as dis-
cussed in the following Section. The remainder of this Part ex-
plores the extent to which the theory of “play in the joints” was 
part of the Court’s jurisprudence and whether Davey faithfully 
employed the concept. 
B. Origins of “Play in the Joints” 
The phrase “play in the joints” comes from a 1970 case, Walz v. 
Tax Commission, in which the concept at least partially animated 
the Court’s decision.107 Although several Supreme Court opinions 
have alluded to this idea since 1963, “play in the joints” hardly en-
joyed the status of settled doctrine. This Section traces the evolu-
tion of the theory, which clearly inspired the thinking of several 
Justices over the years but never figured into an actual holding by 
the Supreme Court until Davey. 
1. Sherbert 
Chief Justice Burger coined the phrase “play in the joints” in 
Walz, but, as he readily acknowledged, the concept traces back at 
least to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Sherbert v. Verner.108 At issue in 
Sherbert was whether South Carolina could deny unemployment 
benefits to a woman who declined to accept employment that 
would require her to work on Saturday, the day she observed as 
the Sabbath. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause re-
quired that South Carolina’s unemployment law include an exemp-
tion for Saturday Sabbatarians.109 Justice Harlan wrote a dissent, 
the tenor of which is instructive. A dissent could have taken several 
tacks. First, it might have noted that the Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence forbade any overt accommodation of relig-
ion, such that exceptions for Saturday Sabbatarians would violate 
 
107 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
108 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Walz, 397 U.S. at 669. 
109 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409–10. 
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the no-aid principle.110 Second, it might have argued that neutral 
laws by definition cannot violate the Free Exercise Clause because 
laws that are generally applicable, even if they burden religious ex-
ercise, pass constitutional muster. This approach is similar to the 
Court’s current Free Exercise jurisprudence.111 Justice Harlan, 
though, preferred a third alternative, a middle ground between the 
majority opinion that categorically required South Carolina to cre-
ate an exception and those who argued that South Carolina was 
forbidden to make any accommodations based on religion. Justice 
Harlan explained his position as follows: 
[I]t would be a permissible accommodation of religion for the 
State, if it chose to do so, to create an exception to its eligibility 
requirements for persons like [Mrs. Sherbert]. The constitutional 
obligation of “neutrality” is not so narrow a channel that the 
slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to 
condemnation.112
Thus, according to Justice Harlan, the Free Exercise Clause did not 
command South Carolina to create an exception, but neither did 
the Establishment Clause forbid it. 
2. Walz 
Although Justice Harlan had dissented in Sherbert, the Court 
endorsed his approach in Walz. At issue in Walz was a New York 
property tax exemption that applied to “real or personal property 
used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable pur-
poses.”113 A New York resident challenged the exemption as a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause.114 Writing for eight Justices, 
Chief Justice Burger placed great emphasis on the notion that the 
Free Exercise Clause does not necessarily require that which the 
Establishment Clause does not forbid. After quoting from Justice 
 
110 Justice Stewart made this point in his separate opinion in Sherbert. Id. at 413–17 
(Stewart, J., concurring in result). 
111 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–80 (1990); Lyng v. Nw. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451–52 (1988). 
112 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citation 
omitted). 
113 Walz, 397 U.S. at 666–67. 
114 Id. 
TRAMMELL_BOOK 11/15/2006 7:19 PM 
1990 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 92:1957 
 
Harlan’s dissent in Sherbert, Chief Justice Burger offered his gloss 
on the Religion Clauses. 
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment . . . is 
this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established 
religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of 
those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for 
play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will 
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and with-
out interference.115
Similarly, the Chief Justice later observed that “[t]he limits of per-
missible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-
extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise 
Clause.”116 One should note that the type of accommodation that 
the Chief Justice discussed in Walz was different than the accom-
modation at issue in Sherbert. In Sherbert, the Court held that the 
Free Exercise Clause required the law to include an exemption for 
religious observation and nothing else. By contrast, the accommo-
dation at issue in Walz was a benefit that the government had also 
made available to other charitable organizations. Perhaps the 
Court in Walz was imprecise when referring to the benefit scheme 
as an “accommodation” of religion, but the terminology was not 
consequential for the Court’s “play in the joints” analysis. 
Given the centrality of the “play in the joints” theory in the 
Court’s opinion, combined with the nearly unanimous support for 
the opinion, the concept arguably acquired doctrinal significance. 
The problem, and one of the great mysteries of the opinion, is that 
for all of the attention the Chief Justice devoted to crafting a the-
ory of “play in the joints,” his efforts yielded little more than a su-
perfluous, albeit catchy, turn of phrase. Walz was an Establishment 
Clause case, not a Free Exercise case. There was no need for the 
Court to mediate the competing demands of the two clauses. If a 
religious organization had claimed that the Free Exercise Clause 
entitled it to a property tax exemption, and a citizen objected 
based on the Establishment Clause, the case would squarely have 
called for the analysis that Chief Justice Burger undertook. As it 
115 Id. at 669. 
116 Id. at 673. 
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was, though, only the Establishment Clause was at issue.117 Thus, 
the broad language with which Chief Justice Burger announced 
and developed a theory of “play in the joints” was in dicta, hardly 
creating settled doctrine. 
3. Witters 
The last major case in this line of precedent was Witters v. Wash-
ington Department of Services for the Blind,118 arguably the most 
relevant case for analyzing the issues presented in Davey. By stat-
ute, Washington provided financial assistance for blind individuals 
to obtain educational and vocational training. When Larry Witters 
applied to the Washington Commission for the Blind in order to 
attend a private Christian college, the Commission denied the re-
quest, relying on Washington’s state constitutional prohibition 
against funding “religious instruction.”119 Interestingly, the state 
constitutional provision was the same one at issue in Davey.120 The 
Court found that inclusion of religious institutions in the assistance 
program would not violate the Establishment Clause,121 but it de-
clined to reach the Free Exercise question: 
On remand, the state court is of course free to consider the ap-
plicability of the “far stricter” dictates of the Washington State 
Constitution . . . . We decline petitioner’s invitation to leapfrog 
consideration of those issues by holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause requires Washington to extend vocational rehabilitation 
117 See id. at 667 (“The essence of appellant’s contention was that the . . . grant of an 
exemption . . . violates provisions prohibiting establishment of religion under the First 
Amendment which under the Fourteenth Amendment is binding on the states.”). Jus-
tice Brennan’s concurrence focused only on whether the exemption violated the Es-
tablishment Clause. Id. at 680–94 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
118 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
119 Id. at 483–84. 
120 Wash. Const. art. I, § 11; see Davey, 540 U.S. at 719 n.2; Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of 
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 484 (1986). 
121 The majority opinion by Justice Marshall emphasized that the state gave financial 
aid to students who then could direct the money to the institution of their choosing. 
For Justice Marshall, the element of private choice alleviated any Establishment 
Clause concerns, such that there was no state action in support of religion. Witters, 474 
U.S. at 487–89. Justice Powell’s concurrence underscored that Mueller v. Allen, 463 
U.S. 388 (1983), provided precedential support for the Court’s holding that the pro-
gram at issue in Witters would not violate the Establishment Clause. Witters, 474 U.S. 
at 490–92 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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aid to petitioner regardless of what the State Constitution com-
mands or further factual development reveals, and we express no 
opinion on that matter.122
By refusing to answer the Free Exercise question, the Court 
seemed to take a minimalist approach. 
On remand, the Washington Supreme Court had no trouble con-
cluding that the Washington Constitution created an absolute bar 
to aiding religious instruction.123 Furthermore, in finding that the 
denial of the benefit did not have a coercive effect on individuals’ 
private choices, the court concluded that the Washington Constitu-
tion did not violate the federal Free Exercise Clause.124 The United 
States Supreme Court denied certiorari on this question.125
As a matter of precedent, the denial of certiorari meant noth-
ing,126 such that the Supreme Court remained agnostic about 
whether the Free Exercise Clause should prevent Washington from 
enforcing its stricter nonestablishment principle. The history of 
Witters, though, is quite instructive. In Part III of the Supreme 
Court opinion, Justice Marshall went to great lengths to explain 
that the Court’s holding invalidated only Washington’s interpreta-
tion of the reach of the federal Establishment Clause. The Court 
declined to address the Free Exercise issue. Although this appears 
to be an act of restraint, it is an odd exercise of judicial modesty 
unless the Supreme Court believed that Washington could indeed 
apply its stricter nonestablishment provision without running afoul 
of the federal Free Exercise Clause. 
The first time that Witters came before the Washington Supreme 
Court, that court fully addressed the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause. Since the court concluded that the program 
was invalid under the federal Establishment Clause, it declined to 
address the Washington Constitution’s “far stricter” nonestablish-
ment provision.127 If the Supreme Court believed that there was a 
colorable argument that Washington had misinterpreted both of 
 
122 Witters, 474 U.S. at 489–90 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
123 Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1121–22 (Wash. 1989). 
124 Id. at 1122–23. 
125 Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). 
126 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–92 (1953). 
127 Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 55–58 (Wash. 1984). 
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the federal Religion Clauses, there is no apparent reason why it 
would have addressed only one of them.128
The most logical explanation for the Supreme Court’s actions is 
that while the Washington Supreme Court had incorrectly inter-
preted the Establishment Clause, it had faithfully applied the Free 
Exercise precedents. On closer examination, this seems accurate as 
a matter of doctrine. Although Justice Marshall’s majority opinion 
did not substantively address Mueller v. Allen,129 five Justices made 
clear that Mueller controlled the Establishment Clause inquiry in 
Witters.130 In Mueller, the Court upheld a tax deduction for educa-
tional expenses, even when the expenses involved sectarian school 
tuition, because the benefit was neutrally available and the result 
of private choice.131 To the extent that Witters involved an analo-
gous program, Mueller was directly on point, and the Washington 
Supreme Court’s decision in Witters misapplied governing Estab-
lishment Clause precedent. By contrast, the Supreme Court likely 
viewed Washington’s application of the Free Exercise precedents 
as essentially correct. The first Witters decision by the Washington 
Supreme Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did not 
require the state to make financial aid available for the study of re-
ligion.132 Despite the ripeness of the Free Exercise question, the 
Supreme Court did not address the issue in its 1986 decision and 
did not grant certiorari on the question in 1989. One can thus rea-
sonably infer that the Court believed Washington had correctly 
applied the Free Exercise Clause. If that is the case, the history of 
 
128 One might suppose that the Supreme Court wanted to give the Washington court 
an opportunity to construe its nonestablishment provision independently of the fed-
eral Establishment Clause. Theoretically, it is possible that the state court on remand 
might have interpreted the Washington Constitution to permit inclusion of religious 
schools. If the state court had taken this approach and allowed inclusion of religious 
options, the Free Exercise question might have become moot. The problem is that the 
state court had given no indication that Washington’s nonestablishment principle at 
all hinged on the federal Establishment Clause, and the state court had already 
opined that Washington’s constitutional provision was “far stricter” than the federal 
Establishment Clause. Thus, a decision by the Washington court on remand in no way 
would have mooted any potential Free Exercise question that Witters raised. 
129 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
130 Witters, 474 U.S. at 490 (White, J., concurring); id. at 490–92 (Powell, J., concur-
ring, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist); id. at 493 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
131 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398–99. 
132 Witters, 689 P.2d at 57. 
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Witters would support the notion of “play in the joints”—the Es-
tablishment Clause did not prohibit Washington from making fi-
nancial aid available to students of religion, but neither did the 
Free Exercise Clause require an opposite result. 
The evidence for a theory of “play in the joints”—Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Sherbert, an extensive discussion of the concept 
in Walz (albeit in dicta), and the history of Witters—is far from 
overwhelming. Nevertheless, it did enjoy a certain historical pedi-
gree prior to the Court’s Davey decision. 
C. Did Davey Faithfully Apply the “Play in the Joints” Theory? 
Despite a flurry of commentary in the wake of Davey, few aca-
demics have seriously addressed whether Davey faithfully applied 
the concept of “play in the joints.” The obvious counterargument 
to Davey—that the Free Exercise Clause embodies a principle of 
neutrality—has abounded, but only one scholar seems to have met 
the Court on its own turf. Professor Manns has argued that the 
“play in the joints” theory to which Walz gave voice is legitimate, 
but it is moored in the axiom that government must always behave 
neutrally with respect to religion. What he terms “true Walz free 
play” should govern assessments of whether religious organizations 
can participate in government funding schemes. “True Walz free 
play” is present when religion motivated neither “(1) the creation 
of the subsidized and non-subsidized classes [n]or (2) the assign-
ment of religion to a particular class.”133 When the government cre-
ates a general public benefit, it must decide whether religious insti-
tutions are sufficiently analogous to the secular institutions that 
partake of the benefit. If the religious and secular institutions are 
clearly analogous, the benefit should be available on a neutral basis 
to all similarly situated institutions. Only when there is a credible 
argument that the religious and secular institutions do not share 
the same relevant characteristics for purposes of the public benefit 
can there be “true free play.”134 Thus, Professor Manns essentially 
argues that there is a zone of discretion within which the state may 
choose to include religion in a general program or exclude religion 
 
133 Manns, supra note 67, at 659. 
134 See id. at 664. 
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from the program; however, the zone of discretion is quite lim-
ited.135
Professor Manns cites the circumstances and logic of Walz as il-
lustrative of “true free play.” New York had created a property tax 
exemption for nonprofit organizations that stood in a “harmonious 
relationship to the community” and fostered its “moral or mental 
improvement.”136 According to Professor Manns, New York could 
have reasonably placed religious organizations in either the fa-
vored or disfavored group based on an assessment of whether reli-
gious groups met the neutral, secular objectives of the tax exemp-
tion. This is “true Walz free play.”137 Underscoring this 
interpretation of Walz was the Court’s emphasis on the secular ob-
jectives of the tax exemption and the fact that the exemptions nei-
ther advanced nor inhibited religion.138 Unlike in Walz, the religion-
based classification in Davey violated both prongs of the “free 
play” analysis. Religion qua religion was a motivating factor in the 
creation of the favored and disfavored categories—devotional the-
ology versus all other majors. With the violation of the first ele-
ment, attaining the second element of neutral categorization be-
came impossible.139
Professor Manns brings theoretical clarity to the “play in the 
joints” debate, but his analysis seems to apply to only one case—
Walz. This criticism may be slightly unfair because Walz, after all, 
is the only case to have developed even a semblance of a justifica-
tion for the “play in the joints” theory. Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
Sherbert, the history of Witters, and even Davey itself do little more 
than draw on the intuition that a zone of discretion for state action 
exists between the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause and 
the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. Nonetheless, what 
Professor Manns refers to as “true Walz free play” does not appear 
to offer a generalizable theory. In Sherbert, Justice Harlan made 
clear that, in his view, South Carolina could permissibly create an 
 
135 This interpretation of “play in the joints” seems to address Justice Scalia’s con-
cern that “play in the joints,” as presented by the majority in Davey, would provide no 
practical bounds on the state’s authority to discriminate against religion. See Davey, 
540 U.S. at 730 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
136 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 n.1, 672 (1970). 
137 Manns, supra note 67, at 666–67. 
138 Id. at 666.  
139 Id. at 668. 
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exception to an otherwise neutral unemployment statute for Satur-
day Sabbatarians.140 Although the Court did not decide Sherbert as 
a “play in the joints” case, but rather required the state to create an 
accommodation, neutrality is arguably lacking—the Court sanc-
tioned facially differential treatment of religion. More tellingly, the 
history of Witters indicates that the Court found unobjectionable 
the very state constitutional provision that Professor Manns, in the 
context of Davey, claims is a violation of “true Walz free play.” 
Unlike the neutral benefit scheme at issue in Walz, the Washington 
Constitution singles out religion for disparate treatment. 
In addition to the fact that Professor Manns’s theory does not 
apply to the full panoply of cases in which the Court has advanced 
the logic of “play in the joints,” the theory depends almost entirely 
on the analytical baseline and the level of abstraction at which the 
inquiry is cast. Justice Scalia noted the baseline problem in Davey, 
arguing that a generally available benefit is the proper baseline for 
assessing whether the state has discriminated against religion.141 
Similarly, in Walz the question turned on whether the proper base-
line was that all institutions, including religious ones, were subject 
to the same property tax regime or, instead, that nonprofit organi-
zations were all eligible for a tax exemption. Without a coherent 
theory of which baseline is appropriate, Professor Manns’s theory 
can do little work. Furthermore, absent the most explicit animus 
toward a particular religious viewpoint, the level of abstraction is 
consequential. The Washington constitutional provision calling for 
greater separation of church and state, when cast at a low level of 
abstraction, mandates differential treatment of religion and 
thereby violates the tenets of “true Walz free play.” At a higher 
level of abstraction, though, the provision simply seeks to ensure 
greater autonomy for the spheres of government and religion. 
From an ex ante perspective, then, Washington’s nonestablishment 
provision seeks neither to inhibit nor to advance religion. 
The theory that Professor Manns articulates has a certain appeal, 
but it may not do much work in practice. Although Davey, when 
seen through the lens of Walz, may appear to violate “true Walz 
free play,” so too do Justice Harlan’s preferred resolution of Sher-
 
140 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
141 Davey, 540 U.S. at 726–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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bert and the result in Witters, which the Court implicitly sanctioned. 
A thorough appraisal of the entire line of “play in the joints” cases, 
however tenuous they may be, reveals that Davey was not out of 
step with the relevant precedents. Admittedly, the precedents are 
susceptible to the criticism that Professor Manns and Justice Scalia 
level against the theory of “play in the joints”—it has no limiting 
principle. The side constraints that Professor Manns posits might 
be reasonable and advisable, but the Court has not embraced them 
as a general matter. Despite all of these criticisms, as well as argu-
ments in favor of other analytical tools discussed in the following 
Sections, Davey’s “play in the joints” logic seems consonant with 
the case law. 
III. THE FUNDING CASES AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
This Part turns to the last line of precedent—the government 
funding cases. In general, the government has wide latitude to fund 
those activities that advance its desired policies and to refuse to 
fund other activities. An important limitation on this maxim is the 
proscription of unconstitutional conditions. A rich literature exists 
on the topic,142 but an in-depth exploration of unconstitutional con-
ditions is not necessary for present purposes. Instead, this Part 
sketches the basic idea of unconstitutional conditions in order to 
provide some context for the two cases most relevant to this analy-
sis, Rust v. Sullivan143 and Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.144 Rust 
and Velazquez, each involving funding schemes created by the 
government, grappled with whether the viewpoint neutrality re-
quirement of the public forum analysis was applicable to funding 
cases. 
The essence of unconstitutional conditions theory is that “gov-
ernment may not grant a benefit on the condition that the benefici-
ary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may 
 
142 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 Geo. L.J. 1 (2001); David Cole, Beyond Uncon-
stitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded 
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675 (1992); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The 
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1984); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989). 
143 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
144 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
TRAMMELL_BOOK 11/15/2006 7:19 PM 
1998 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 92:1957 
 
withhold that benefit altogether.”145 For the purposes of assessing 
Rust and Velazquez, as well as their interaction with the public fo-
rum cases, the most important precedent dealing with unconstitu-
tional conditions is FCC v. League of Women Voters.146 The Court 
demarcated what the government could legitimately decline to 
fund while still steering clear of an unconstitutional condition. Al-
though the government can specify how state funds are to be spent, 
it may not place conditions on the recipient’s other, unrelated ac-
tivities.147 If it is feasible to separate the government-funded activi-
ties from other activities that the government does not want to 
support, the Court is more likely to sustain a funding restriction.148
In Rust, the Court upheld a provision of Title X that prevented 
family planning facilities receiving government assistance from dis-
cussing abortion with patients. Much of the Court’s logic rested on 
the fact that the activities that the government wanted to fund were 
separable from other activities, such as abortion counseling. In 
other words, a family planning facility could maintain a “separate 
and independent” program that could advise patients about abor-
tion and would remain distinct from the projects benefiting from 
governmental aid.149 By contrast, Velazquez held that the Legal 
Services Corporation (“LSC”), which received government funds 
to help represent indigent clients, could not be subject to condi-
tions preventing LSC lawyers from challenging the constitutional-
ity of welfare laws on behalf of their clients. According to the 
Court, differentiating the types of arguments that a lawyer could 
145 Sullivan, supra note 142, at 1415. For example, in one of the earliest unconstitu-
tional conditions cases, Speiser v. Randall, the Court held that California could not 
condition a property tax exemption for veterans on the swearing of a loyalty oath. 357 
U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958). The loyalty oath functioned as an unconstitutional condition 
because “[i]ts deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine [veterans] for this 
speech.” Id. at 518. 
146 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
147 Id. at 399–400; see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (observing that the Court’s “‘uncon-
stitutional conditions’ cases involve situations in which the Government has placed a 
condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or ser-
vice”) (emphasis in original). In League of Women Voters, governmental support of a 
noncommercial television station amounted to only one percent of the station’s in-
come; therefore, the government did not have a right to impose conditions on the en-
tire panoply of activities in which the station engaged. 468 U.S. at 400. 
148 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400. 
149 Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. 
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make (constitutional versus other challenges) was not feasible, 
such that the statutory restriction amounted to an unconstitutional 
condition.150 Velazquez’s attempt to distinguish Rust is not convinc-
ing, because in both situations the government sought to fund par-
ticular activities and permitted the service providers to establish 
independent projects that could engage in activities that the gov-
ernment refused to fund.151 Furthermore, the restrictions in Rust 
arguably interfered with the doctor-patient relationship at least as 
much as the restrictions in Velazquez impaired the lawyer-client re-
lationship. Despite the Court’s efforts to distinguish the two cases, 
there is an insuperable tension between Rust and Velazquez. 
Judging by the language of Rust, there is no reason to think that 
it has anything to do with the government speech or public forum 
cases.152 After the fact, though, the Court essentially converted 
Rust’s holding into one that pertains to governmental speech. 
Rosenberger sought to distinguish Rust, which at first blush might 
have seemed to control the inquiry as to whether the University of 
Virginia had to fund particular activities. If Rust stood for the 
proposition that the government had wide discretion in its funding 
decisions, the University had arguably acted within the zone of its 
discretion. But the Court in Rosenberger recast Rust as a case in 
which the government effectively used private parties to convey its 
message,153 an interpretation that Velazquez reaffirmed.154 Despite 
the persistence of the Court’s reinterpretation of Rust, the fact that 
unconstitutional conditions cases now turn on the speaker’s iden-
tity has led to considerable confusion. When a funding scheme is at 
issue, the government often seeks to convey no message at all. Rust 
150 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546–48 (2001). 
151 See id. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
152 The Court dismissed the First Amendment challenge in Rust by noting that re-
cipients were not penalized for engaging in certain speech because they could always 
have declined the subsidy, and the restrictions applied only to the use of Title X 
funds. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199. 
153 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust as a case in which “the government dis-
burse[d] public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message”). 
154 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (“The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on 
the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to 
governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have 
explained Rust on this understanding.”). The Court cited Board of Regents v. South-
worth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), and Rosenberger as examples of the recasting of Rust. Ve-
lazquez, 531 U.S. at 541; see also Kavey, supra note 90, at 753–54. 
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would appear to be such a case; however, courts must now deter-
mine who is speaking—the government or private parties—even 
though this may be something of a trick question.155
By treating Rust as a government speech case, the Court has ef-
fectively permitted seemingly unrelated doctrines—the public fo-
rum and unconstitutional conditions cases—to inform an inquiry as 
to the constitutionality of a funding scheme. In Velazquez, the pub-
lic forum doctrine took center stage and largely subsumed the un-
constitutional conditions inquiry. As noted above, an honest ap-
praisal of the scheme in Velazquez probably indicates that, because 
of the separability of government-funded and privately funded le-
gal representation, the conditional nature of the government assis-
tance should not have been unconstitutional. Cutting in the oppo-
site direction, though, was the issue of viewpoint neutrality 
demanded by the public forum doctrine. While conceding that the 
LSC was not an actual forum for the exchange of ideas, the Court 
noted that “limited forum cases such as . . . Rosenberger may not 
be controlling in a strict sense, yet they do provide some instruc-
tion.”156 The Court acknowledged that when the government 
speaks, viewpoint discrimination is permissible.157 By contrast, the 
government was not attempting to convey any particular message 
through the LSC, such that the requirements of viewpoint neutral-
ity still obtained.158
The underlying relevance of the tension between Rust and Ve-
lazquez is twofold. First, the conversion of Rust and most funding 
cases into speech cases has forced courts to ask misleading and in-
choate questions about who the real speaker is, even though a 
speaker as such may not exist. The recasting of Rust also obscures 
the distinction between true funding cases (arguably Rust is such 
155 In his dissent in Velazquez, Justice Scalia took umbrage at the characterization of 
Rust as involving government speech: “If the private doctors’ confidential advice to 
their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‘government speech,’ it is hard to imagine 
what subsidized speech would not be government speech.” Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 554 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
156 Id. at 544 (majority opinion). 
157 Id. at 541. In Rust, the Court held that the government had not engaged in view-
point discrimination. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. In light of Rosenberger’s recasting of Rust, 
though, it seems more accurate to say that viewpoint discrimination is permissible, but 
only if the government itself seeks to convey a particular message. See Kavey, supra 
note 90, at 753–54. 
158 See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542. 
TRAMMELL_BOOK 11/15/2006 7:19 PM 
2006] The Cabining of Rosenberger 2001 
an example) and hybrids of funding and speech cases (such as 
Rosenberger). Second, and perhaps more importantly, Rust and Ve-
lazquez reached diametrically opposed conclusions on the question 
of whether the public forum doctrine will apply, by analogy, out-
side of the forum context. Rust essentially held that in funding 
cases, the government has wide discretion, thereby rendering a 
public forum inquiry inapposite. Velazquez explicitly acknowl-
edged the value of a public forum inquiry,159 even in the context of 
a funding scheme that did not create a forum as such. Both cases 
seem highly relevant to Davey, yet the Court failed to mention ei-
ther one.160 It did, however, appear to resolve the tension in favor 
of Rust by emphasizing the discretion that the government pos-
sesses when funding particular programs.161 One might speculate as 
to why the Court did not mention either case—although the Court 
seemed to endorse the “original” holding of Rust, it probably did 
not want to acknowledge that Rosenberger had transmogrified Rust 
from a funding case into a speech case. Regardless of the Court’s 
reasons for not mentioning either Rust or Velazquez, it seems that 
Velazquez’s approach of extending the public forum doctrine into 
new contexts is now the exception rather than the rule. The basic 
principle that the government has wide discretion over funding de-
cisions remains robust. 
IV. THE INTERACTION OF THE THREE LINES OF PRECEDENT 
While the three competing lines of precedent—public forum, 
“play in the joints,” and funding cases—often seem to stand in ten-
sion with one another, they can actually exist in a symbiotic rela-
tionship and successfully balance competing values. This Part ex-
plains how the three lines of precedent can be triangulated and 
then uses the example of Davey to illustrate how all three could 
have informed that case. Thereafter it examines courts’ receptivity 
to this triangulation. The underlying principle of the funding 
cases—that government has wide discretion in choosing which pro-
grams to fund—is uncontroversial, and only a handful of cases have 
 
159 Id. at 544. 
160 See Laycock, supra note 13, at 179–80. 
161 Davey, 540 U.S. at 721 (“The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct cate-
gory of instruction.”). 
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dealt with “play in the joints” in the wake of Davey; therefore, 
those cases warrant only brief mention. The bulk of the analysis fo-
cuses on the public forum logic of Rosenberger and how readily 
courts have treated Rosenberger as announcing a broad nondis-
crimination principle. 
A. Triangulating the Precedents 
At first blush, one might assume that a broad nondiscrimination 
principle is irreconcilable with a theory of “play in the joints” and 
the fundamental premise of the funding cases. At least one of the 
three lines of cases must seemingly yield to the others. If “play in 
the joints” is to have any meaning, and if the state truly has wide 
discretion in choosing which programs to fund, then there is argua-
bly no room for a broad nondiscrimination principle. Conversely, if 
the nondiscrimination principle governs questions such as those 
raised in Davey, then any notion of “play in the joints” apparently 
disappears and the state’s discretion over funding decisions is se-
verely curtailed. 
Despite the intuition that all three lines of precedent cannot si-
multaneously govern certain constitutional questions, the princi-
ples are reconcilable. As noted in Part I, a broad nondiscrimination 
principle is not unbounded.162 Specifically, a nondiscrimination 
principle is reconcilable with the “play in the joints” and funding 
cases if the principle applies only when the government has created 
a generally available benefit. Under funding cases such as Rust v. 
Sullivan, the government still has wide discretion to spend money 
in numerous ways without creating a generally available benefit. 
For example, the government might appropriate money for certain 
types of environmental research. The money is quite obviously not 
“generally available”—only certain individuals can receive such 
funding (such as people with the appropriate scientific qualifica-
tions who propose to conduct only the research in which the gov-
ernment is interested). Furthermore, when the government has not 
created a generally available benefit, the concept of “play in the 
joints” remains robust. For instance, a local government might 
adopt a school-choice program whereby parents can select which 
public school their children attend. The program arguably does not 
 
162 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
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create a general entitlement to select any school; instead, only chil-
dren who attend public schools are eligible to participate in the 
school-choice program. This is a situation in which the Establish-
ment Clause would not necessarily prohibit the government from 
creating a broader voucher scheme that would allow parents and 
students to choose from among a wider array of schools, including 
private religious schools. The Free Exercise Clause, however, does 
not demand inclusion of religious schools because the school-
choice program is not a generally available benefit. By contrast, 
once the government has created a generally available benefit, a 
broad nondiscrimination principle would prevent the state from 
singling out religion for facially differential treatment. 
The facts of Locke v. Davey usefully illustrate how the three 
lines of precedent could fruitfully have interacted. Under the fund-
ing cases, Washington enjoyed wide discretion in choosing whether 
to create a scholarship program. Furthermore, Washington could 
have made Promise Scholarships available only to students pursu-
ing certain majors that the state deemed particularly important, 
such as mathematics and the hard sciences. If certain majors were 
not eligible for Promise Scholarship funding, such as foreign lan-
guages or devotional theology, such differentiation would be 
largely unproblematic—the government’s choices would need to 
survive only rational basis scrutiny (which they almost invariably 
could).163 Under the Establishment Clause and the theory of “play 
in the joints,” Washington had latitude to put devotional theology 
on the list of eligible majors (perhaps alongside education, engi-
neering, nursing, and other more practical areas of study). Again, 
the classifications would have to survive only rational basis scru-
tiny. On the actual facts of Davey, though, Washington had estab-
lished a generally available benefit—Promise Scholarships were 
available to every student who met the income and academic re-
quirements. The only exception was for students of devotional the-
163 One might envision an attempt by the government, in delineating those eligible 
for a benefit, to enumerate every category of potential recipients except religious or-
ganizations or individuals. Such an exhaustive list that did not include religion might 
also violate the nondiscrimination principle. Admittedly, discerning whether the gov-
ernment has generated such an exhaustive list would involve line-drawing difficulties, 
but the difficulties would arguably be no worse than those that courts confront on a 
frequent basis. 
TRAMMELL_BOOK 11/15/2006 7:19 PM 
2004 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 92:1957 
ology. Once the state has created a generally available public bene-
fit, the broad nondiscrimination principle would require that relig-
ion receive equal treatment. One of the most vexing questions un-
der this approach would concern whether the government has 
indeed established a generally available funding scheme, but Davey 
surely represents the clearest example of a generally available 
benefit from which religion, and only religion, was excluded.164
The actual opinion in Davey unsatisfactorily dealt with the three 
relevant lines of precedent. Despite embracing the theory of “play 
in the joints,” the Court did not satisfyingly engage the idea, re-
maining silent as to the theory’s history and scope and alluding 
hastily to its bona fides.  As for Rosenberger and the other public 
forum cases, the Court dismissed them as inapposite in one para-
graph of a footnote, because the Promise Scholarship Program was 
not designed to “encourage a diversity of views from private 
speakers.”165 It seems odd, though, that the Supreme Court could so 
tersely dismiss Rosenberger since the Ninth Circuit opinion had re-
lied heavily on the logic of Rosenberger.166 Finally, the Court in 
Davey did not cite either of the most relevant funding cases—Rust 
or Velazquez. From a doctrinal perspective, this is among the deci-
sion’s most serious shortcomings, especially because the Court 
more or less embraced the original logic of Rust—the notion that 
the state has wide discretion when choosing which activities it will 
fund.167 An honest appraisal of the funding cases, though, would 
have forced the Court to confront and distinguish Velazquez, 
 
164 One might argue that Promise Scholarships were not generally available benefits 
in light of the income and academic requirements that students had to meet in order 
to be eligible. But given that those requirements were mere thresholds (rather than 
guidelines vesting discretion in the government) and that they were irrelevant to the 
majors covered by the scholarships, it is fairly clear that Promise Scholarships were 
“generally available.” 
165 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3 (internal citations omitted). 
166 See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 755–56 (9th Cir. 2002). 
167 Although Rust would have provided significant support for the outcome in 
Davey, invoking Rust would have forced the Court to reassess Rosenberger’s trans-
formation of Rust into a case about government speech. See supra notes 152–58 and 
accompanying text. Absent an actual government message, as was the case in Davey, 
the revised understanding of Rust was apparently inapposite. Returning to Rust’s 
original holding would have compelled the Court to overrule the reinterpretation of 
Rust by Rosenberger and subsequent cases. Perhaps understandably, the Court was 
unwilling to do this. 
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which explicitly relied on the logic of Rosenberger, even though the 
government had not created a true public forum in Velazquez. 
Davey presented the ideal case in which the Court could have 
balanced the three lines of precedent. It could have acknowledged 
the full breadth of “play in the joints” and the government’s discre-
tion to spend money selectively while also indicating that a nondis-
crimination principle could actually have teeth. Instead of recog-
nizing a symbiosis between the three lines of cases, though, the 
Court allowed the theory of “play in the joints” and, by implica-
tion, the funding cases to subsume any trappings of a nondiscrimi-
nation principle. 
B. Funding Cases and “Play in the Joints” Cases in the Courts 
Although the Supreme Court in Davey did not strike the balance 
between the three competing lines of precedent in the way that this 
Note has argued is feasible, the following Sections consider the ex-
tent to which courts have embraced separately each of the three 
lines of cases. This Section briefly examines the funding cases and 
the “play in the joints” cases, and the next Section turns to the 
more controversial issue of whether courts have interpreted 
Rosenberger as embodying a broad nondiscrimination principle. 
The basic premise of the funding cases is so uncontroversial that 
it hardly merits further discussion. As a matter of first principles, 
the government clearly has discretion to make funding decisions. 
The question that this Note has considered is what limits attach to 
the general axiom. Although the notion of unconstitutional condi-
tions has informed the extent of the government’s discretion to 
spend money and manage state property, the premise of govern-
mental spending discretion remains strong.168
In the wake of Davey, the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
thus far embraced the concept of “play in the joints” and given it 
full effect. Writing for a unanimous Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
the only Supreme Court case that has cited Davey, Justice Gins-
burg described Davey as “reaffirm[ing] that ‘there is room for play 
in the joints between’ the Free Exercise and Establishment 
 
168 See, e.g., Cooper v. Florida, 140 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing, inter 
alia, Davey for the proposition that the government does not violate a fundamental 
right when it refuses to subsidize that right). 
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Clauses . . . .”169 Interestingly, the Court continued to indulge the 
idea that “play in the joints” has long informed questions arising 
from the Religion Clauses, even though Davey was the first case 
that explicitly endorsed the theory. More significantly, the Court 
apparently rejected the suggestion by some academics that “play in 
the joints” might apply narrowly to the facts of Davey. Professors 
Berg and Laycock noted that the Court in Davey focused on the 
long-standing tradition of not funding the training of clergy;170 how-
ever, Cutter has confirmed their intuition that “play in the joints” 
would sweep more broadly. 
Lower court opinions have similarly embraced the logic of “play 
in the joints.” In holding that the federal government may provide 
certain benefits to public school children only, thereby denying 
such benefits to children in private religious schools, the First Cir-
cuit cited Davey for the proposition that “play in the joints” affords 
the government such discretion.171 Earlier this year, the Second Cir-
cuit cited Davey for the broader proposition that the City of New 
York could seek to avoid even potential Establishment Clause vio-
lations without running afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. New 
York City’s Department of Education had permitted schools to 
display menorahs during Chanukah and the star and crescent dur-
ing Ramadan but forbidden crèche displays at Christmas. It rea-
soned that “the crèche conveys its religious message more repre-
sentationally and less symbolically than the menorah and the star 
and crescent.”172 The Second Circuit cited Davey’s invocation of 
“play in the joints” and held that the City’s conclusion was reason-
able even if it was not compelled by the Establishment Clause.173
In the few years since the Supreme Court decided Davey, the 
premise of the government funding cases and the theory of “play in 
169 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005) (quoting Davey, 540 U.S. at 
718). At issue in Cutter was Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000, which provided special protection for inmates’ religious exercise. 
The Court found that the provision did not violate the Establishment Clause, even 
though the Free Exercise Clause did not require such special protection. See id. at 
2116–17. 
170 Berg & Laycock, supra note 28, at 250, 252. 
171 Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 20–21 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004) (“If any 
room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here.” (quoting Davey, 540 
U.S. at 725)). 
172 Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 28 (2d Cir. 2006). 
173 See id. 
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the joints” are robust. The only remaining question concerns the 
extent to which courts have construed Rosenberger as announcing 
a principle that could extend beyond the context of public fora. 
C. Rosenberger in the Courts 
Having considered the various arguments and precedents for 
discerning a broad nondiscrimination principle rooted in Rosen-
berger, this Note turns to how the Supreme Court and lower fed-
eral courts have actually treated Rosenberger. In many ways the re-
sults of this analysis are unremarkable. Almost all of these 
decisions have treated Rosenberger as a narrow decision, confined 
it to its facts, and cited it only for the most general truisms about 
the public forum doctrine. Such cabining of Rosenberger is instruc-
tive, though, because it illustrates the Court’s unwillingness to 
transform the First Amendment into a set of positive entitlements. 
Even if Rosenberger was correct on its facts, a point about which 
considerable debate exists, courts have eschewed the notion that it 
stands for a broad nondiscrimination principle. 
1. Rosenberger in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has consistently endeavored to sanitize 
Rosenberger by indulging the notion that it was a public forum case 
and somehow not a funding case. Supreme Court cases in which 
Rosenberger figured prominently into the Court’s analysis gener-
ally fall into two categories: cases in which Rosenberger is directly 
on point and cases in which at least one party has invoked Rosen-
berger as standing for a broad nondiscrimination principle outside 
of the public forum context. In the former, the Court has faithfully 
applied Rosenberger. In the latter, it has repeatedly observed, 
without analysis, that Rosenberger is irrelevant when the govern-
ment has not created a public forum. There seem to be only two 
exceptions to this basic dichotomy—the Court’s rationale in Legal 
Services Corp. v. Velazquez174 and several observations in dicta in 
Mitchell v. Helms.175
 
174 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
175 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
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Two cases seem to be on all fours with Rosenberger. First, Board 
of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth176 was 
the obverse of the same coin—an activities fund at a public univer-
sity. At issue was whether students at the University of Wisconsin, 
who had to pay a mandatory student activity fee, could demand the 
right not to contribute to organizations espousing viewpoints with 
which the students disagreed.177 As in Rosenberger, the Court con-
cluded that the University required students to contribute to the 
fund in order to facilitate an exchange of ideas, not to compel cer-
tain speech; however, the University did have to distribute the 
funds in a viewpoint-neutral manner. Interestingly, the Court was 
cagey as to whether the fund actually constituted a limited public 
forum, but it applied the usual standards of the public forum doc-
trine, focusing primarily on viewpoint neutrality.178 The second 
case, Good News Club v. Milford Central School,179 seemed even 
more straightforward under Rosenberger. The Court held that a 
public school system had created a limited public forum by making 
its facilities available and thus could not discriminate against reli-
gious groups because such a distinction would entail viewpoint dis-
crimination. In doing so, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed 
Rosenberger and asserted that Rosenberger was dispositive of the 
case.180 These cases seem straightforward because they involved, re-
spectively, facts that were strikingly similar to Rosenberger and a 
classic limited public forum (school facilities). Thus, it was unnec-
essary for the Supreme Court to venture beyond the black-letter 
holdings of Rosenberger. 
Similarly, the Court has cited Rosenberger frequently for the 
general standards governing a public forum analysis.181 In such con-
texts, Rosenberger does little if any work in light of the public fo-
rum precedents that already delineate the forum categories and 
176 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
177 Id. at 222–23, 227. 
178 Id. at 229–30 (holding that the “public forum cases are instructive here by close 
analogy. This is true even though the student activities fund is not a public forum in 
the traditional sense of the term . . . .”); id. at 233 (observing that the requirement of 
viewpoint neutrality was the touchstone of Rosenberger). 
179 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
180 Id. at 110–12. 
181 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673, 690 (1998). 
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their attendant requirements.182 Good News Club, for instance, in-
volved a physical forum from which religious organizations, consis-
tent with the principle of equal access, could not be excluded. Al-
though Rosenberger was directly on point, it was superfluous in 
light of Widmar v. Vincent, the 1981 case holding that certain uni-
versity facilities constituted a public forum.183 For purposes of as-
sessing conventional fora, Rosenberger seems to do hardly any in-
dependent work. Only in situations that possibly invite the 
expansion of public forum analysis would Rosenberger actually add 
to the Court’s jurisprudence. 
The Court has usually declined to extend the logic of Rosenber-
ger beyond conventional fora or funding schemes highly analogous 
to the SAF at issue in Rosenberger. In Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe, the Court held that when a school allowed one stu-
dent to offer a public prayer before school football games, the 
school district had not created a limited public forum for speech.184 
This conclusion seems consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence on 
public fora generally—the school district had not made the time 
and space generally available. Similarly, in United States v. Ameri-
can Library Ass’n, the Court refused to find that the mere presence 
of Internet access in a public library created a public forum for the 
exchange of ideas; consequently, the Court deemed Rosenberger to 
be inapposite.185
More difficult and novel questions arose in National Endowment 
for the Arts v. Finley, a case in which several artists argued that the 
National Endowment for the Arts (“N.E.A.”) had created a public 
forum by making funds generally available to artists, such that 
viewpoint-based discrimination was impermissible.186 Finley was the 
first case to test the bounds of Rosenberger and, specifically, the 
idea that generally available funds could constitute a public forum. 
The artists’ argument failed, though. Although the Court’s opinion 
was not a paragon of clarity, it signaled that the Court would only 
182 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 
(1983). 
183 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981); see supra notes 38–41 and accom-
panying text. 
184 530 U.S. 290, 302–03 (2000). 
185 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003). 
186 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
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reluctantly find that a funding scheme functioned as a public fo-
rum.187 Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion emphasized that by es-
tablishing the N.E.A. the government did not “indiscriminately ‘en-
courage a diversity of views from private speakers’” but instead 
sought to promote excellence in the arts.188 By prefacing the quota-
tion from Rosenberger with the word “indiscriminately,” Justice 
O’Connor subtly narrowed the realm of funding schemes that 
could be considered public fora—only programs intended to foster 
a veritable free-for-all among private speakers. The small trans-
formation of Rosenberger’s holding was somewhat surreptitious 
because under this formulation the Court probably would not have 
found that the SAF in Rosenberger itself was a limited public fo-
rum. Justice Souter, the lone dissenter in Finley, would have found 
a limited public forum, such that Rosenberger should have con-
trolled the case.189 The other eight Justices made clear, however, 
that only when the government has unambiguously and without 
reservation created a forum for the exchange of ideas should public 
forum logic obtain. 
The Court’s unwillingness to expand Rosenberger’s reach has 
become a mainstay of its jurisprudence. A few possible exceptions 
warrant attention. The only case in which the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly extended the logic of Rosenberger to a funding scheme that 
did not actually create a public forum is Legal Services Corp. v. Ve-
lazquez.190 Although the Court in Velazquez evinced solicitude for 
the approach of Rosenberger and other public forum cases, Ve-
lazquez is the exception that proves the rule, as no other case has 
embraced the extension of Rosenberger’s logic in this way.191
187 For instance, even though the majority found that the N.E.A. had not created a 
public forum, the Court nonetheless took pains to argue that the restrictive criteria at 
issue in Finley entailed content-based discrimination but not viewpoint discrimina-
tion. See id. at 581, 585. This concern seems warranted if the Court were treating 
N.E.A. funding as a nonpublic forum; however, the majority seemed inclined to view 
Finley as a funding case only, such that the government should have had nearly unfet-
tered discretion to favor certain viewpoints over others. Justice Scalia argued as much 
in his separate opinion. Id. at 596–97 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
188 Id. at 586 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834) (emphasis added). 
189 Id. at 600–01, 613 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
190 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
191 Despite the invocation of the public forum doctrine, Velazquez almost surely 
stands for nothing more than the result it reached. The result probably had more to 
do with an issue near and dear to any judge—the ability of lawyers to do their jobs—
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The only other instance in which the Court even intimated that 
Rosenberger might be anything more than a public forum case was 
Mitchell v. Helms.192 In Mitchell, the federal government distributed 
funds to localities, which used the money to lend secular educa-
tional materials to public and private schools, including religious 
schools. The Supreme Court concluded that the program, as ap-
plied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, did not run afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause.193 In a footnote, Justice Thomas, writing for a plu-
rality, addressed a Free Exercise question that the case did not 
actually present. “[A]s petitioners observe, to require exclusion of 
religious schools from such a program would raise serious ques-
tions under the Free Exercise Clause.”194 Justice Thomas cited to 
Rosenberger, analogizing the Free Speech question at issue there to 
the Free Exercise question that he hypothesized in Helms. The 
footnote was clearly in dictum because the statute had not actually 
excluded religious schools. Also in dictum, Justice Thomas treated 
Rosenberger as standing for the proposition that the government 
may not “discriminat[e] in the distribution of public benefits based 
upon religious status or sincerity.”195 Although both observations 
indicate Justice Thomas’s willingness to embrace the broad nondis-
crimination principle that Rosenberger seemed to announce, his 
observations appear to be little more than the personal observa-
tions of a single Justice. Both statements were dicta made in the 
course of a plurality opinion. They hardly portend a doctrinal shift 
away from the Court’s consistent practice of cabining Rosenberger 
as a public forum case. 
2. Rosenberger in the Lower Courts 
As one would expect, lower court decisions have wrestled with 
the implications of Rosenberger more frequently and extensively 
than has the Supreme Court. A thorough review of all the circuit 
court opinions that have discussed Rosenberger reveals a pattern 
similar to the Supreme Court’s approach. Lower courts most fre-
 
rather than a judgment about whether the Legal Services Corporation had sought to 
foster an exchange of diverse viewpoints. 
192 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
193 Id. at 801–03. 
194 Id. at 835 n.19. 
195 Id. at 828. 
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quently cite Rosenberger as standing for general propositions that 
are not unique to Rosenberger. Courts have also cited Rosenberger 
for several ideas that are specific to the case. For instance, courts 
often turn to Rosenberger when assessing the constitutional differ-
ences between government and private speech as well as how 
courts should understand the exclusion of religious perspectives 
from a forum. Many courts have also discussed the language in 
Rosenberger that lies at the heart of the nondiscrimination princi-
ple; however, the bulk of the opinions have not taken the next step 
of applying the principle outside of the forum context. Finally, sev-
eral cases merit particular attention because they have at least en-
tertained whether a nondiscrimination principle, as discerned from 
Rosenberger, is widely applicable. 
The first and most obvious truism for which courts have cited 
Rosenberger is the evil of viewpoint discrimination in all fora.196 
Since at least 1983, when the Supreme Court decided Perry, the 
presumptive unconstitutionality of viewpoint discrimination in any 
forum has been clear.197 Consequently, Rosenberger broke no new 
ground in this respect. On the other hand, at least some judges 
have cited Rosenberger for a variation on the theme of viewpoint 
neutrality. Rosenberger observed that “exclusion of several 
views . . . is just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion 
of only one.”198 For example, the Sixth Circuit cited this language in 
striking down a state agency’s policy of prohibiting “controversial” 
advertising on public transportation, including a union’s message. 
Despite the agency’s willingness to exclude both pro- and anti-
union speech, the court described this as viewpoint discrimina-
tion.199 The fact that most courts do not invoke Rosenberger for 
 
196 See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 622 (4th Cir. 2002); DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 
566 (7th Cir. 2001); Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 350 (5th Cir. 2001); 
Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 540, 542 (6th Cir. 
2001). 
197 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). 
198 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. 
199 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Tran-
sit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 361–62 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 290 (2d Cir. 1997) (Parker, J., dissenting) (citing the same lan-
guage from Rosenberger and concluding that “[i]f multiple voices are silenced, the de-
bate is simply skewed in multiple ways”). 
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such a proposition is unsurprising because the exclusion of multiple 
viewpoints might shade into subject-matter exclusions, which can 
be permissible in some fora. Frequent citation to this passage in 
Rosenberger would thus blur the already tenuous line between 
viewpoint and subject-matter distinctions. 
The second reason courts often cite Rosenberger concerns the 
requirements of a limited public forum. While having to remain 
viewpoint neutral, the government may exclude certain subject 
matters from a limited public forum if the exclusions are reason-
able in light of the character of the forum.200 Again, the idea is not 
unique to Rosenberger, but lower courts often draw on Rosenber-
ger’s succinct discussion of limited public fora.201
Third, courts frequently cite language in Rosenberger noting the 
murky distinction between subject-matter and viewpoint discrimi-
nation.202 To borrow an example from Judge Reinhardt, astrology 
might be a subject matter about which astrologers have unique and 
divergent views. Alternatively, it might be a viewpoint within the 
larger subject matter of the study of the heavens, such that exclu-
sion of astrology would entail viewpoint discrimination.203
The notion of an imprecise boundary between viewpoints and 
subject matters is one that courts and commentators have long dis-
cussed.204 Rosenberger’s acknowledgment of the point is fairly un-
remarkable, but Rosenberger did address an important manifesta-
tion of the problem: is “religion” a subject matter or a viewpoint? 
In nearly every instance, religion will be a viewpoint under Rosen-
berger. After all, this question was at the heart of the debate be-
tween Justice Kennedy, for the majority, and Justice Souter, in dis-
sent. As several lower courts have noted, though, the majority left 
 
200 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
201 See, e.g., Justice For All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 766 n.7 (5th Cir. 2005); Ei-
chenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 280 (3d Cir. 2004); Goulart v. Meadows, 
345 F.3d 239, 249–50 (4th Cir. 2003); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 1999); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County 
Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1297 (7th Cir. 1996). 
202 See, e.g., Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 150 (2d Cir. 
2004); PMG Int’l Div. LLC v. Rumsfeld, 303 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002); Gen. 
Media Commc’ns, 131 F.3d at 281; Grossbaum, 100 F.3d at 1298. 
203 Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001). 
204 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History 
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713, 1751 (1987); see also 
Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 700–01. 
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open the remote possibility that religion, as an entire subject mat-
ter, could be excluded from a forum;205 however, excluding religion 
as a subject matter is very difficult. In virtually every forum—even 
a limited or nonpublic forum—someone will almost always be able 
to address a secular topic within the purview of the forum from a 
religious perspective. Thus, religion will be a viewpoint, according 
to the logic of Rosenberger, in nearly every forum.206
As discussed in Part III, one of Rosenberger’s principal innova-
tions is the recasting of Rust v. Sullivan as a government speech 
case. According to this approach, courts must now assess who is 
speaking—governmental or private entities. Lower courts have 
drawn on the language in Rosenberger indicating that the require-
ment of viewpoint neutrality obtains only when the government 
funds private speakers. When the government seeks to convey its 
own message, it does not have to remain viewpoint neutral.207 Al-
 
205 See, e.g., Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th 
Cir. 2004); DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 969–70; Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 917–18 
(10th Cir. 1997). These courts have relied on language in Rosenberger indicating that 
religion, as a subject matter, could be excluded from a forum: 
By the very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University does not exclude religion as 
a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts 
with religious editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also 
provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a 
variety of subjects may be discussed and considered. 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. 
206 In only one case has a court thoroughly parsed Rosenberger and concluded that a 
forum had properly excluded religion as a subject matter. The Eleventh Circuit in 
Bannon concluded that an elementary school mural was a nonpublic forum. Bannon, 
387 F.3d at 1217. At issue was whether prohibition of a student’s overtly religious con-
tribution was an acceptable subject-matter restriction in pursuit of a legitimate peda-
gogical purpose. The court decided that, in contrast to Rosenberger, the student in 
Bannon sought to communicate an inherently religious message rather than foster a 
“discussion of secular topics from a religious perspective.” Id. at 1216. A Ninth Circuit 
case, DiLoreto, also purported to decide that religion had properly been excluded as a 
subject matter from a limited public forum. DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 969–70. At issue 
was the exclusion of an advertisement displaying the Ten Commandments at a high 
school baseball game. Although the court said that the excluded subject matter was 
religion as such, the court’s language indicates that the excluded subject matter was 
actually advertisements that did not solicit business. If this assessment of DiLoreto is 
correct, then Bannon is the only lower court decision to find that religion was not a 
viewpoint for purposes of public forum analysis. 
207 See, e.g., Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 612–13 (5th Cir. 2005); Planned Parent-
hood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Armenti, 247 
F.3d 69, 74–75 (3d Cir. 2001); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013–
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though this inquiry might be misguided, particularly when govern-
ment funding schemes have no communicative elements, lower 
courts have faithfully hewed to the dichotomy between govern-
ment and private speakers. 
Among the most interesting ideas for which lower courts have 
cited Rosenberger is what this Note has argued is the first step in 
finding a broad nondiscrimination principle in Rosenberger. Spe-
cifically, Rosenberger rejected the idea that the government could 
exclude religion from a public forum in order to avoid a potential 
Establishment Clause violation. “To obey the Establishment 
Clause, it was not necessary for the University to deny eligibility to 
student publications because of their viewpoint. . . . There is no Es-
tablishment Clause violation in the University’s honoring its duties 
under the Free Speech Clause.”208 Several lower courts have cited 
this portion of Rosenberger, which indicates that remaining view-
point neutral toward religion is consistent with the Establishment 
Clause.209 This is the critical first step in locating a nondiscrimina-
tion principle in Rosenberger because it means that the government 
may not discriminate against religion unless an actual Establish-
ment Clause violation is imminent. The second step, though, in-
volves applying these principles outside of the forum context. 
While lower courts have faithfully applied this holding from 
Rosenberger, the overwhelming majority of lower courts have done 
so only in the context of public fora. 
In two rare lower court cases, judges have actually addressed 
whether Rosenberger announced a broad nondiscrimination prin-
ciple. The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected such a principle, and a 
Fourth Circuit panel did not adopt a dissenting judge’s broad read-
ing of Rosenberger. Probably the most intriguing case to assess 
Rosenberger’s implications for Free Exercise jurisprudence is the 
 
14 (9th Cir. 2000); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 
1085, 1094 n.11 (8th Cir. 2000). 
208 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46. 
209 See, e.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 
386 F.3d 514, 530 (3d Cir. 2004); Summum, 130 F.3d at 921; Bronx Household of Faith 
v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 220 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cabranes, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 
1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 1996); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 
63 F.3d 581, 593–94 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Gentala v. City of Tucson.210 The court 
concluded that the city of Tucson, Arizona, properly declined to 
provide lighting and sound equipment for a National Day of Prayer 
event in order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, even 
though the city had provided such services for nonreligious 
events.211 Speaking through Judge Berzon, the court noted the 
axiom that government does not violate Free Exercise rights by 
denying a subsidy to a religious organization.212 It then distin-
guished Rosenberger on the ground that Rosenberger did not turn 
in any way on the Free Exercise Clause: “if the failure to subsidize 
a religious activity . . . violated the Free Exercise Clause, the [Su-
preme] Court would have said so in Rosenberger and written a very 
different, and much shorter, opinion.”213 Gentala argued that the 
Free Exercise Clause, though admittedly within the letter of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Rosenberger, played little if any role in 
the Court’s assessment of Free Speech and Establishment Clause 
interests. The Ninth Circuit consequently rejected the idea that 
Rosenberger could stand for a broad nondiscrimination principle. 
The other opinion that grappled with the possible expansiveness 
of Rosenberger is Judge Wilkinson’s dissent in Columbia Union 
College v. Clarke.214 At issue was the Sellinger program, which 
Maryland had established in order to aid private colleges. In order 
to be eligible for educational funding, colleges could not be “perva-
sively sectarian.” Most of the Fourth Circuit’s analysis turned on 
Columbia Union College’s eligibility. In a dissenting opinion, 
though, Judge Wilkinson argued that since the funds provided by 
the Sellinger program were generally available, application of the 
public forum doctrine was appropriate in accordance with Rosen-
berger.215 Although Judge Wilkinson said that the Sellinger pro-
gram was in fact a limited public forum, this assertion seems im-
precise because Maryland had not created a forum for the 
dissemination of ideas. Instead, the public forum analysis would 
have been appropriate only by way of analogy and on the strength 
 
210 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
211 Id. at 1067–68. 
212 Id. at 1081 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983)).
213 Id. at 1082. 
214 159 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998). 
215 Id. at 170 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting). 
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of the fact that Maryland had made funds generally available, as 
the Supreme Court concluded that the University of Virginia had 
done in Rosenberger. Judge Wilkinson’s conclusion that a state is 
obligated to distribute generally available funds in a viewpoint-
neutral manner seems justified in light of Rosenberger. Neverthe-
less, his analysis was in dissent, placing him in a distinct minority of 
judges and scholars who have been willing to embrace the broad 
implications of Rosenberger. 
In many ways, lower court opinions have paralleled the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of Rosenberger. Most courts have cited Rosen-
berger only for general propositions about the public forum doc-
trine. Others have noted the enduring dichotomy between gov-
ernment and private speech. While several courts have observed 
that the command of viewpoint neutrality is not inconsistent with 
the dictates of the Establishment Clause, courts have been unwill-
ing to apply this logic outside of the public forum context. In fact, 
only two opinions have seriously engaged the idea that Rosenber-
ger might have announced a nondiscrimination principle against re-
ligion that would apply to all government funding schemes. The 
Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected such an approach, and Judge Wil-
kinson’s willingness to embrace a nondiscrimination principle was 
confined to a dissenting opinion. Lower courts thus seem to have 
internalized the cabining of Rosenberger. 
3. The Future of Rosenberger 
The Supreme Court has signaled its unwillingness to extend the 
logic of Rosenberger beyond the public forum context, and lower 
courts have proceeded in almost lock step. Thus, it does not seem 
far-fetched to assert that Davey confirmed the cabining of Rosen-
berger. Despite this categorical assertion, there is reason to believe 
that a nondiscrimination principle may eventually find its way back 
into the Court’s jurisprudence. Justice Thomas’s dicta in Mitchell v. 
Helms and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Davey indicate those Justices’ 
willingness to embrace such a principle. Furthermore, then-Judge 
Alito’s opinion in Child Evangelism might indicate his inclination 
toward a more robust interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.216 
 
216 See Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 
530 (3d Cir. 2004); see also supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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If the Court does eventually move toward a nondiscrimination 
principle, what remains unclear is the extent to which the principle 
would coexist with the theory of “play in the joints” and the fund-
ing cases. As indicated earlier, the competing lines of precedent do 
stand in some tension, but they are not contradictory; rather, they 
provide meaningful checks on one another. If the Court embraced 
a nondiscrimination principle in this light, its jurisprudence would 
not necessarily shift dramatically. At this point, though, such in-
quiries are premature and entirely speculative. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that the Supreme Court in Rosenberger 
appeared to announce a broad principle of nondiscrimination with 
respect to religion. Rosenberger was a unique vehicle for the Court 
to stake such a claim, because the case involved a government 
funding scheme. Subsequent Supreme Court and lower court opin-
ions have nonetheless cabined Rosenberger as a public forum opin-
ion, with Davey providing final confirmation that Rosenberger does 
not in fact stand for any broader principle. 
Through a close analysis of the three relevant lines of prece-
dent—public forum, “play in the joints,” and government funding 
cases—this Note has sought to determine the robustness of those 
precedents and their interactions with one another. As a general 
matter, the government enjoys wide discretion when it chooses to 
fund, or not to fund, particular programs. Davey confirmed such 
discretion while also endorsing, for the first time in an actual hold-
ing, the theory of “play in the joints.” The public forum cases, at 
least in the immediate aftermath of Rosenberger, would have indi-
cated that a nondiscrimination principle might have functioned as a 
check on this otherwise unlimited discretion; however, courts have 
refused to extend the reach of the public forum doctrine. 
The three lines of precedent offer different modes of analysis 
and often look in different directions, but they are not inconsistent. 
Although some scholars have viewed Davey as making an inevita-
ble choice between contradictory doctrines, this Note has argued 
that the three lines of precedent can coexist. If a nondiscrimination 
principle exists in the context of funding cases, it would apply only 
when the government has created a generally available benefit. 
Such a nondiscrimination principle would then serve as a minimally 
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intrusive check on the state’s power to fund projects of its choice. 
But at least for now the Court has struck the balance in favor of 
deference to state funding decisions, irrespective of any differential 
treatment of religion, effectively cabining Rosenberger. 
